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ABSTRACT 
Analysis of cases decided under Title I of the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act (ADA), which addresses employment discrimination, reveals that 
defendants have consistently prevailed in well over 90% of cases since the 
ADA’s inception. This empirical evidence has led many commentators to 
conclude that the ADA’s Title I has failed to improve workplace conditions 
for individuals with disabilities.  
This Article attempts to assess the efficacy of Title I through a different 
lens. It focuses on several data sets that have previously received little at-
tention. It examines Equal Employment Opportunity Commission merit 
resolutions, lawsuit settlement statistics, and reports concerning reasonable 
accommodation requests processed by private and public sector employers. 
These statistics reveal that employers are reasonably responsive to Title I 
claimants outside of the courthouse setting and that the ADA has in fact 
improved workplace conditions for employees with disabilities. 
The more general point made by this Article is that the efficacy and im-
pact of statutory mandates cannot be judged based solely on reported court 
opinions. Rather, data concerning the behavior of those covered by the stat-
utes and extra-judicial dispute resolution are essential to an assessment of 
whether a statute has achieved the societal changes that it was designed to 
effect. Consequently, this article emphasizes the need for more comprehen-
sive empirical studies concerning ADA claim resolutions and outlines a 
proposal for mandatory reporting of settlement outcomes and the process-
ing of reasonable accommodation requests by employers. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)1 prohibits em-
ployment discrimination against “qualified individual[s] with . . . dis-
abilit[ies].”2 A plethora of empirical evidence has revealed that plaintiffs 
fare very poorly in Title I cases that are resolved through judicial determina-
tions.3 This Article attempts to assess ADA outcomes through a different 
lens. It asks whether Title I has been successful outside the courtroom and 
judicial chambers. This is a critical question because most cases that are 
filed are resolved through settlement or unreported opinions,4 and it is en-
  
 1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 (2000). 
 2. Id. § 12112.  
 3. See Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1813 (2005) (discussing studies that evince low plaintiff win rates). See infra Part 
II for a detailed discussion of studies that establish low plaintiff win rates. 
 4. See, e.g., Kathryn Moss et al., Prevalence and Outcomes of ADA Employment Discrimination 
Claims in the Federal Courts, 29 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 303, 303, 305–06 (2005). 
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tirely possible that many, if not most, individuals who have an ADA em-
ployment discrimination problem do not file a lawsuit in court at all.5 
The Article examines enforcement statistics from the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), limited data that exists concerning 
settlement amounts in ADA Title I cases, and a number of reports of dis-
ability employment policies and practices in the private and public sectors 
to determine whether individuals with disabilities have experienced greater 
success when judges have not resolved their cases. I argue that EEOC reso-
lutions, settlement statistics, and survey responses of human resources per-
sonnel all indicate that employers are reasonably responsive to Title I 
claimants in the relatively informal settings of internal requests for accom-
modation, EEOC conciliations, and settlement negotiations. Consequently, 
contrary to the contention of many commentators,6 Title I of the ADA can-
not be conclusively deemed a failure. Although judges may be resistant to 
ruling in favor of ADA plaintiffs, the ADA may well have achieved impor-
tant changes in workplace behavior and made the workplace more hospita-
ble to individuals with disabling physical and mental impairments.  
Thus, the larger point made by this Article is that the efficacy and reach 
of statutory mandates cannot be judged based solely on published court 
opinions. In order to accurately assess the impact of the ADA’s Title I, 
scholars must obtain settlement information and data concerning institu-
tional grievance procedures and employers’ processing of accommodation 
requests, none of which is readily available to the public. This information 
would also enable lawyers to litigate more intelligently because it would 
allow them to determine the value of their cases in light of outcomes in 
cases with similar facts. The Article urges that further empirical studies be 
conducted and that reporting mechanisms be established to facilitate access 
to this currently elusive data.  
The remainder of the Article will proceed as follows: Part II discusses a 
number of studies that have analyzed judicial resolutions of Title I cases in 
federal court. It also offers a first of its kind study of ADA Title I cases that 
have been litigated in state court and concludes that state court outcomes 
closely resemble federal court outcomes. Part III discusses settlement statis-
tics from the EEOC and from limited data sets concerning cases that were 
settled after being filed in court. Part IV discusses several reports that ad-
dress employers’ processing of reasonable accommodation requests. These 
provide insight into ADA compliance within the workplace before formal 
disputes develop and claims reach the EEOC and the courts. Part V offers 
analysis and recommendations based on the data described above. 
  
 5. See William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, 
Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 636 (1980–81) (“[O]nly a small fraction of injurious 
experiences ever mature into disputes.”). 
 6. See Waterstone, supra note 3, at 1812 (explaining that scholars who have written about “Title I 
of the ADA view[] the ADA as disappointing”). 
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II. JUDICIAL DETERMINATION 
Numerous studies have confirmed that plaintiffs experience extremely 
low win rates in cases decided under Title I of the ADA.7 The American Bar 
Association’s (ABA) Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law 
has conducted numerous studies focusing on Title I decisions gather primar-
ily through Westlaw searches “and [from] various media outlets.”8 The first 
study analyzed cases from 1992 to 1997, and the subsequent seven, con-
ducted from 1998 to 2004, are annual surveys of federal court cases.9 The 
surveys consider an employer to have won the case if the plaintiff’s com-
plaint is dismissed or the employer prevails on the merits, and an employee 
to have won if she prevails on the merits.10 Opinions resolving preliminary 
matters—such as those denying summary judgment to employers—are con-
sidered to render neither party a winner because they lead to no final resolu-
tion, and thus they are not included in the surveys’ calculations.11  
The 2004 study summarizes the results of all prior surveys and con-
cludes that the plaintiff win rates are as follows:  
1992-1997: 7.9%  
1998: 5.7%  
1999: 4.3%  
2000: 3.6%  
2001: 4.3%  
2002: 5.5%  
2003: 2%  
2004: 3%.12 
Several academic scholars have published similar studies. Professor 
Ruth Colker’s 1999 survey concluded that defendants prevailed in 94% of 
cases at the federal district court level and in 84% of cases in which losing 
  
 7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117. 
 8. See, e.g., Amy L. Allbright, 2004 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I—Survey Up-
date, 29 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 513, 513 (2005). 
 9. Id. The cases included in the reports are all federal court cases. See Amy L. Allbright, 2006 
Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I—Survey Update, 31 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. 
REP. 328, 328 (2007). 
 10. Allbright, supra note 8, at 513. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 515. 
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plaintiffs appealed their judgments.13 Professor Colker acknowledges that 
relying on published opinions may have skewed her results.14 She states that 
only 42% of appellate court opinions affirming lower court decisions are 
published15 and that at the trial court level unreported opinions and verdicts 
would most likely reveal a win rate that is even lower for plaintiffs than the 
one evident from reported cases.16 This is because of the many summary 
opinions that are not made accessible to the public in which judges often 
rule in favor of defendants but rarely provide a victory on the merits to 
plaintiffs.17 
Louis S. Rulli published a study of all reported ADA cases that were 
litigated in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania during 1996, 1997, and 
1998.18 Rulli found that “employers prevailed in 94.2 percent of [Title I] 
cases,” experiencing their highest win rate in 1998.19  
These extremely low win rates are not characteristic of plaintiffs filing 
non-disability employment discrimination cases. For example, according to 
Professor Colker, plaintiffs litigating cases under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)20 obtained reversals in 34% of the cases they 
appealed, a much higher percentage than the 12% pro-plaintiff reversal rate 
under the ADA.21 A study of sexual harassment cases concluded that plain-
tiffs prevailed in 54.1 % of cases “decided on pretrial motions,” 45.7 % of 
bench trials, and 54.% of jury trials.22 At the appellate level, both plaintiffs 
and defendants who appealed obtained reversals in 27% of the cases.23 A 
study of Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)24 litigation re-
  
 13. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 107–08 (1999) [hereinafter Colker, Windfall]. In a subsequent study, Colker ana-
lyzed appellate cases in greater detail in order to determine which factors might predict ADA appellate 
outcomes. See Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 239, 239 (2001) [hereinafter, Colker, Winning and Losing]. Examining a database of 720 published 
and unpublished cases available on Westlaw, she found that employers obtained “full reversal in 42% of 
[the cases that they appealed and had] damages [reduced] in an additional 17.5% of cases.” Id. at 239, 
244–45, 248. Plaintiffs who appealed pro-employer judgments, however, obtained reversals “in only 
12% of cases.” Id. at 248.  
 14. See Colker, Windfall, supra note 13, at 104–05, 108–09. 
 15. Id. at 105. 
 16. Id. at 109. 
 17. See id. 
 18. Louis S. Rulli, Employment Discrimination Litigation Under the ADA from the Perspective of 
the Poor: Can the Promise of Title I be Fulfilled for Low-Income Workers in the Next Decade?, 9 TEMP. 
POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 345, 365–66 (2000). 
 19. Id. The author notes that defendants were slightly less successful in ADA Title II and Title III 
cases, prevailing in 91.7% and 85.7% of cases, respectively. See id. at 366 n.149. 
 20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000). Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on 
“race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” See id. § 2000e-2. 
 21. See Colker, Winning and Losing, supra note 13, at 248, 253. It should be noted that the 12% 
plaintiff reversal rate reported in Colker’s 2001 article is inconsistent with the 16% plaintiff reversal rate 
reported in her 1999 article. Compare id. with Colker, Windfall, supra note 13, at 107–08, and supra text 
accompanying note 13. 
 22. Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL L. 
REV. 548, 570 (2001). 
 23. See id. at 574. 
 24. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2000). 
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vealed that overall, defendants prevailed in only 25.8% of cases and plain-
tiffs won 8.7% of cases, while approximately 58% of cases were resolved 
through settlement.25 Thus, ADEA plaintiffs obtained favorable decisions in 
over 20% of cases that did not settle.26  
No formal study has been published concerning state court cases that 
resolved ADA employment discrimination claims.27 My own research iden-
tified 110 cases decided between 1994 and 2006 that reached final resolu-
tions on the merits of Title I claims. This research includes published and 
unpublished cases reported on LEXIS. The cases reveal a slightly but not 
dramatically better plaintiff win rate than that found in federal court. Em-
ployers prevailed in ninety-three or 91.81% of cases,28 while plaintiffs pre-
vailed in nine, or 8.82%,29 of cases. 
  
 25. See George Rutherglen, From Race to Age: The Expanding Scope of Employment Discrimina-
tion Law, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 491, 513 (1995). These figures do not add up to 100%, but the author does 
not explain how the remainder of the cases are resolved. See id.; see also THEODORE EISENBERG & 
STEWART J. SCHWAB, DOUBLE STANDARD ON APPEAL: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION CASES IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (July 2001), available at 
http://www.findjustice.com/files/Eisenberg_&_Schwab_Report.pdf. The study found that with respect to 
employment discrimination cases litigated in federal court, defendants won 43.61% of cases they ap-
pealed after a plaintiff’s trial victory and 44.74% of cases they appealed after a plaintiff’s pretrial vic-
tory. See id. at 7, 11. Plaintiffs won only 5.8% of cases they appealed after a defendant’s trial victory and 
11.03% of cases they appealed when a defendant had obtained a pretrial victory. See id. at 8, 11. The 
study did not provide a more specific analysis relating to different categories of claims, such as race, age, 
and disability. See id. at 3 (“The data do not allow one to analyze just title VII cases or just ADA 
cases.”). 
 26. See Rutherglen, supra note 25, at 513. 
 27. See, e.g., Moss et al., supra note 4, at 308 (stating that the author’s study “did not include Title I 
cases . . . decided in . . . state court” and noting that the number of such cases is relatively small). 
 28. Cremeens v. Montgomery, 779 So. 2d 1190, 1201 (Ala. 2000); Bullion v. JMBL, Inc., 657 So. 
2d 834, 837 (Ala. 1995); State Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Sexton, 748 So. 2d 200, 217–18 (Ala. Civ. App. 
1998); Guo v. Maricopa County Med. Ctr., 992 P.2d 11, 19 (Ariz. App. 1999); Hill v. Los Angeles, No. 
B160641, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8317, at *31 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2003); Elrod v. Costco 
Wholesale Co., No. B159303, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5511, at *29 (Cal. Ct. App. June, 4 2003); 
Arias v. Bank of Am., No. B158686, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2742, at *25 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 
20, 2003); Moreno v. San Joaquin, No. C035807, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4289, at *37 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Feb. 4, 2002); Postel v. Vista Paint Corp., No. E029782, 2001 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2516, at 
*20 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2001); Diffey v. Riverside County Sheriff's Dep't, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 353, 359 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000), overruled in part by Colemares v. Braemer Country Club, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 662 
(Cal. 2003); Real v. Compton, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 531, 541 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); Le Bourgeois v. Fireplace 
Mfrs., 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 660, 669 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Brundage v. Hahn, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 830, 838 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1997); Archer v. Farmer Bros. Co., 90 P.3d 228, 232 (Colo. 2004); Ezikovich v. Comm'n on 
Human Rights & Opportunities, 750 A.2d 494, 500 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000); Conn. Comm'n on Human 
Rights & Opportunities v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. CV010507207S, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 55, at 
*20 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 2002); Hodge v. U.S. Delivery Sys. - New England, Inc., No. CV 
970569497S, 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1950, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 21, 2000); DeMello v. Conn. 
Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, No. CV 980489424S, 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 45, at *10 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 2000); Doe v. Odili Techs., Inc., No. CV 970327738S, 1999 Conn. Super. 
LEXIS 3120, at *21 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 1999); Katona v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportu-
nities, No. CV 970057035S, 1998 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2020, at *30 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 15, 1998); 
Ezikovich v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, No. CV 970567872, 1998 Conn. Super. 
LEXIS 1329, at *18 (Conn. Super. Ct. May, 11 1998); Fillies v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportu-
nities, No. CV 960152557, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2623, at *10–11 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 29, 
1997); Bauman v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, No. CV 94 053 24 74, 1996 Conn. Super. 
LEXIS 397, at *9 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 13, 1996); Sann v. Renal Care Ctrs. Corp., No. 94A-10-001, 
1996 Del. Super. LEXIS 11, at *15 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 1996); Wimberly v. Sec. Tech. Group., Inc., 
866 So. 2d 146, 148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Brooks v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 695 So. 2d 
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879, 881 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Hensley v. Punta Gorda, 686 So. 2d 724, 728 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1997); Ball v. Fulton-Dekalb Hosp. Auth., 576 S.E.2d 1, 2 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002); Bitney v. Honolulu 
Police Dep’t, 30 P.3d 257, 269 (Haw. 2001); Levinger v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 75 P.3d 1202, 1209 (Idaho 
2003); Raedlein v. Boise Cascade Corp., 931 P.2d 621, 625 (Idaho 1996); Ziegler v. State, 55 Ill. Ct. Cl. 
405, 410 (Ill. Ct. Cl. 2002); Powdertech, Inc. v. Joganic, 776 N.E.2d 1251, 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); 
Hansen v. Seabee Corp., 688 N.W.2d 234, 244 (Iowa 2004); Schlitzer v. Univ. of Iowa Hosps. & Clin-
ics, 641 N.W.2d 525, 532 (Iowa 2002); Howell v. Merritt Co., 585 N.W.2d 278, 281 (Iowa 1998); Bear-
shield v. John Morrell & Co., 570 N.W.2d 915, 924 (Iowa 1997); Cole v. Staff Temps, 554 N.W.2d 699, 
707 (Iowa 1996); Schall v. Wichita State Univ., 7 P.3d 1144, 1163 (Kan. 2000); Noel v. Elk Brand Mfg. 
Co., 53 S.W.3d 95, 106 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000); Muhammad v. New Orleans Police Dep't, 791 So. 2d 788, 
792 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Antoine v. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr., 681 So. 2d 1282, 1286–87 (La. Ct. 
App. 1996); Nerenberg v. RICA of S. Md., 750 A.2d 655, 686 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000); Dartt v. 
Browning-Ferris Indus., 691 N.E.2d 526, 537 (Mass. 1998); Wooster v. Abdow Corp., 709 N.E.2d 71, 
78 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999); Curtis v. Fitchburg, No. 97-1375A, 2003 Mass. Super. LEXIS 170, at *36 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 2, 2003); White v. Boston, No. 95-6483-F, 1997 Mass. Super. LEXIS 358, at *20 
(Mass. Super. Ct. July 22, 1997); Dolan v. Bay Constr. Group Co., No. 92-4947, 1994 Mass. Super. 
LEXIS 417, at *16 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 1994); Peden v. Detroit, 680 N.W.2d 857, 873 (Mich. 
2004); Jackson v. Lorence, No. 222798, 2001 Mich. App. LEXIS 1984, at *18 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 
2001); Collins v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 579 N.W.2d 435, 441 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998); Martin 
v. Dep't of Corr., No. 182046, 1996 Mich. App. LEXIS 2092, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct 4, 1996); Schei-
derich v. Minneapolis, No. C8-00-185, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 808, at *11 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 
2000); Ross v. New Brighton, No. C3-98-1095, 1998 Minn. App. LEXIS 1215, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Nov. 3, 1998); Bouta ex rel. Bouta v. Comm'r of Human Servs., No. C3-95-2250, 1996 Minn. App. 
LEXIS 447, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 1996); Hauglid v. Denn, No. C4-95-1589, 1996 Minn. App. 
LEXIS 282, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 1996); McNally v. Mora Med. Ctr., Ltd., No. C3-95-1938, 
1996 Minn. App. LEXIS 120, at *9 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 1996); Botto v. Bosley, 995 S.W.2d 544, 
544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999); McGinnis v. City of East Helena, 63 P.3d 512 (Mont. 2002) (unpublished 
table decision); Walker v. Mont. Power Co., 924 P.2d 1339, 1344 (Mont. 1996); Ferraro v. Long Branch, 
714 A.2d 945, 957–58 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998); Katcher v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 
75 P.3d 877, 882 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003); Fallon v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 687 N.Y.S.2d 
123, 123 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999); Wilkins v. Gilford County, 582 S.E.2d 74, 79 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003); 
Baddour v. Rehab. Servs. Comm'n, No. 04AP-1090, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 5123, at *21 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Oct. 27, 2005); Cox v. Kettering Med. Ctr., No. 20614, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 4526, at *13 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2005); Baird v. S. Ohio Med. Ctr., No. 04CA2939, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 5339, at 
*21 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2004); House v. Kirtland Capital Partners, 814 N.E.2d 65, 75 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2004); Tripp v. Beverly Enters.-Ohio, Inc., No. 21506, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 6158, at * 41 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2003); Huberty v. Esber Beverage Co., No. 2001-CA-00202, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 
6034, at *18 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2001); Detzel v. Brush Wellman, Inc. 751 N.E.2d 1067, 1077 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2001); Corr. Corp. of Am. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 742 N.E.2d 1177, 1181 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2000); Scott v. Univ. of Toledo, 739 N.E.2d 351, 355 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); Sadinsky v. EBCO 
Mfg. Co., 730 N.E.2d 395, 400 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999); Pfost v. Ohio State Att'y Gen., No. 98AP-690, 
1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 1792, at *14 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 20, 1999); Hodge v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, No. 
97APE10-1390, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 3321, at *12 (Ohio Ct. App. July 14, 1998); Geary v. Lorain 
Metro. Hous. Auth., No. 96CA006514, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 3058, at *14 (Ohio Ct. App. July 9, 
1997); Pfleger v. BP Am., Inc., No. 68874, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 2708, at *22 (Ohio Ct. App. June 27, 
1996); Maloney v. Barberton Citizens Hosp., 672 N.E.2d 223, 227 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Gibson v. 
Simonds Indus., No. 95 AP 060040, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 725, at *11 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 2, 1996); 
Lillback v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 640 N.E.2d 250, 260 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994); Walser v. Ohio Univ., No. 
2003-03680, 2004 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 482, at *19 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Sept. 2, 2004); Howard v. Ohio Dep't of 
Transp., 91 Ohio Misc. 2d 48, 53 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1997); Forcum v. Via Christi Health Sys., Inc., 137 P.3d 
1250, 1253 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006); Imler v. Hollidaysburg Am. Ambulance Serv., 731 A.2d 169, 175 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1999); Anderson. v. Ajax Turner Co., No. 01-A-01-9807-CH-00396, 1999 Tenn. App. 
LEXIS 728, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 1999); Austin v. Shelby County Gov’t, 3 S.W.3d 474, 481 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); Pruett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. W1999-01026-COA-R3-CV, 2000 Tenn. 
App. LEXIS 557, at *4 (Tex. App. Aug. 17, 2000); Collop v. Cont’l Parts Co., No. 05-97-01199-CV, 
2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 2174, at *10 (Tex. App. Apr. 4, 2000); Hartis v. Mason & Hanger Corp., 7 
S.W.3d 700, 705 (Tex. App. 1999); Smith v. Mary Kay, Inc., No. 05-97-00095-CV, 1999 Tex. App. 
LEXIS 6927, at *24 (Tex. App. Sept. 13, 1999); Alonzo v. Mr. Gatti's Pizza, Inc., 933 S.W.2d 294, 298 
(Tex. App. 1996); McLean v. Tacoma, No. 23377-1-II, 1999 Wash. App. LEXIS 1721, at *10 (Wash. 
Ct. App. Sept. 24, 1999). 
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III. SETTLEMENT STATISTICS 
It must be noted that the above statistics are based on cases that are 
available through published reporters or electronic search engines. The vast 
majority of cases, however, do not produce publicly available opinions ei-
ther because they are settled or because the judges choose not to publish 
their rulings.30 According to one source, only 10% to 20% of employment 
discrimination cases filed in federal court generate a published decision,31 
including those appearing in LEXIS but not in reporters.32 The study found 
that 40% to 60% of cases are resolved through settlement, and 20% to 50% 
disappear from public view with no available record.33 A second study esti-
mated that 61% of Title I cases that are filed in federal courts are resolved 
through settlements.34 
Thus, it is abundantly clear that the cases that form the basis of studies 
such as the ABA’s and Professor Colker’s constitute only a small percent-
age of ADA claims and are not necessarily representative of all lawsuits 
filed. Moreover, they do not include Title I employment discrimination 
claims that are filed at the administrative enforcement stage with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or a similar state agency but 
are not later pursued through litigation.35 According to one study, between 
1993 and 2001 an estimated “27,724 . . . lawsuits were filed [nationally] out 
  
 29. Davila v. Merit Sys. Council, 15 P.3d 781, 782 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000); Fail v. Cmty. Hosp., 946 
P.2d 573, 583 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997), aff’d 969 P.2d 667 (Colo. 1998); Int’l Data Operations, Inc. v. 
Comm’n on Human Rights & Opportunities, No. CV000503421, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2061, at *25 
(Conn. Super. Ct. July 20, 2001); Infante v. Thomas, No. CV970395925S, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
1726, at *10 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 20, 2001); Sterling Casino Lines, L.P. v. Chestnut, 825 So. 2d 484, 
484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (per curiam); Handy v. New Orleans Dep’t of Civil Serv., 857 So. 2d 
1071, 1075 (La. Ct. App. 2003); Bazert v. State, 768 So. 2d 279, 284 (La. Ct. App. 2000); Kuechle v. 
Life’s Companion P.C.A., Inc., 653 N.W.2d 214, 222 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002); Krotzer v. N. Country Bus. 
Prods., Inc., No. C0-98-1538, 1999 Minn. App. LEXIS 170, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 1999). These 
do not include cases in which an employee defeated an employer’s motion for summary judgment but 
there is no record of the ultimate outcome of the case. 
 30. See Moss et al., supra note 4, at 303 (explaining that “[p]ublished court decisions are not neces-
sarily representative of overall litigation outcomes” because they account for only a small fraction of 
Title I claims); Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A Comparison 
of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1133, 1145–
47 (1990) (discussing the process that generates published opinions). 
 31. Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 30, at 1146–47. 
 32. Id. at 1138, 1146. 
 33. Id. at 1146–47; see also Scott Burris et al., Disputing Under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act: Empirical Answers, and Some Questions, 9 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 237, 251 (2000) (citing 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINTS IN U.S. DISTRICT 
COURTS, 1980–98 6 tbl.5 (2000) (noting that in 1998, 35.2% of federal civil rights cases were resolved 
through settlement, 12.5% were voluntarily dismissed, and approximately an additional 23% were re-
solved by means “other than a judgment on the merits”). 
 34. Moss et al., supra note 4, at 305. 
 35. The ADA requires that claimants exhaust their administrative remedies by filing charges of 
discrimination with the EEOC or a state Fair Employment Practice Agency prior to filing suit in court. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2000) (adopting the enforcement procedures set out in Title VII for purposes 
of ADA enforcement); id. § 2000e-5 (discussing the filing of charges with the EEOC and state agencies 
and the charging party’s subsequent right to sue in court under Title VII). 
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of 201,371 eligible administrative charges” alleging discrimination that vio-
lates Title I of the ADA.36  
Although precise results vary among different studies, all the research 
findings reveal that plaintiffs win a startlingly small percentage of cases that 
produce a reported litigation outcome. Furthermore, one study identified 
pretrial motions as the root cause of the low plaintiff win rate, finding that 
plaintiffs who survive to trial, like plaintiffs filing other types of civil rights 
cases, win almost 33% of verdicts.37 Another study reinforces these results, 
finding that of thirty-five ADA cases tried before judges in the U.S. District 
Courts in 1998-2001, plaintiffs won 34.29%, and of 189 ADA cases tried 
before federal court juries during that time, plaintiffs won 41.27%.38 What 
remains largely unavailable and unexplored is information about the out-
comes achieved by plaintiffs in the non-recorded decisions, settlements, and 
informal negotiation processes that resolve the vast majority of ADA 
claims.39  
Because settlement amounts are generally not recorded in publicly 
available court documents, little information is available concerning ADA 
settlements in particular and employment discrimination settlements in gen-
eral.40 Some settlements include a confidentiality provision that prohibits 
disclosure of their details.41 In addition, attorneys may have little incentive 
to respond to questions concerning the settlement amounts of their employ-
ment discrimination cases even if the settlements are not confidential. De-
fense attorneys may fear that the information will be used to encourage em-
  
 36. Moss et al., supra note 4, at 304–05. 
 37. Id. at 305. This conclusion is based on a review of the docket files “[o]f . . . 3,624 closed cases 
with identifiable outcomes” from “a representative sample in 16 federal district courts.” Id.; see also 
Jeffrey A. Van Detta & Dan R. Gallipeau, Judges and Juries: Why Are So Many ADA Plaintiffs Losing 
Summary Judgment Motions, and Would They Fare Better Before a Jury? A Response to Professor 
Colker, 19 REV. LITIG. 505, 561–63, 573 (2000) (finding that potential jurors are sensitive to the needs 
and abilities of individuals with disabilities and do not decide ADA cases based on negative stereotypes).  
 38. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare 
in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 445 (2004). The data was obtained from the Admin-
istrative Office of the United States Courts. See id. at 430. 
 39. See Burris et al., supra note 33, at 251 (“Without proper data, we do not know whether ADA 
plaintiffs in federal court are doing horribly or brilliantly.”). 
 40. See id. (stating that interpretation of “court decision data . . . is complicated by the mass of 
missing cases”); Moss et al., supra note 4, at 308 (explaining that the authors could not verify settlement 
amounts); Martha Neil, Confidential Settlements Scrutinized, Recent Events Bolster Proponents of Limit-
ing Secret Case Resolutions, A.B.A. J., July 2002, at 20 (“Confidential settlements are a mainstay of 
civil litigation in the United States.”) (emphasis removed); see also Rulli, supra note 18, at 372. Profes-
sor Rulli reports that his study of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania revealed that in that district, “be-
tween 47.1 percent and 62.6 percent of all Title I cases settled.” Id. By way of further explanation, he 
details that “[i]n 49.5% of . . . cases, the parties reached an . . . agreement and [asked] the court to dis-
miss the [case] pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41.1(b).” Id. at 372 n.173. Further, “[i]n 
another 13.3% of the cases, the action was dismissed [by] stipulation of the parties, without any refer-
ence to Rule 41.1(b),” and it is unknown what benefits, if any, the plaintiff obtained. Id. Professor Rulli 
suggests that ADA cases may settle less frequently than other types of cases for a variety of reasons, 
including the ADA’s complexity, plaintiffs’ moral convictions, and defendants’ desire to create disincen-
tives for future litigation. See id. at 372.  
 41. See Emily Fiftal, Note, Respecting Litigants’ Privacy and Public Needs: Striking Middle 
Ground in an Approach to Secret Settlements, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 503, 504 (2003). 
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ployees to file cases against their clients in the hope of receiving settlements 
even for weak claims. Plaintiffs’ attorneys may fear that the data will be 
used by plaintiffs to shop around for other lawyers who have obtained larger 
dollar recoveries for their clients. In addition, digging through files and col-
lecting information concerning settlements could constitute time-
consuming, unpaid work that lawyers or their assistants are likely to find 
unappealing. The dearth of settlement information, however, can be detri-
mental to all litigants who wish to settle their cases since it impedes negotia-
tion that is based on research and verifiable data.42 
Nevertheless, a few sources suggest that ADA claimants frequently 
achieve positive outcomes outside of the judges’ chambers.43 I will now 
proceed to examine data from EEOC conciliations and litigation settle-
ments. 
A. EEOC Resolutions 
Statistics compiled by the EEOC provide the most extensive source of 
information concerning ADA complaints that are resolved prior to a court 
opinion or judgment. The EEOC is the administrative agency that enforces 
the federal statutes that prohibit employment discrimination.44 Title VII, the 
ADEA, and the ADA require aggrieved individuals to exhaust their admin-
istrative remedies before turning to the federal courts.45 Aggrieved individu-
als must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC or an equivalent 
state or local agency and await the agency’s determination on the merits or a 
right to sue letter.46 If the EEOC determines that the charge of discrimina-
tion is meritorious, it is required to attempt to resolve the charge through 
conciliation efforts.47  
The EEOC reports several categories of resolutions that are relevant for 
my purposes. The agency defines its terms as follows: 
Settlements (Negotiated) 
Charges settled with benefits to the charging party as warranted 
by evidence of record. In such cases, EEOC . . . is a party to the 
  
 42. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Getting What We Asked For, Getting What We Paid For, and Not 
Liking What We Got: The Vanishing Civil Trial, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 943, 970 (2004) (asserting 
that the unavailablility of settlement statistics is detrimental to litigants because “it is important that we 
have sufficient information about settlement patterns to enable litigants to make rational judgments and 
to have some assurance that a particular settlement has a reasonable relation to other, similar ones”). 
 43. See, e.g., Ann C. Hodges, Dispute Resolution Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: A 
Report to the Administrative Conference of the United States, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1007, 1024–25 
(1996).  
 44. See The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, The Commission, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/commission.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).  
 45. See Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2000); ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626; ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 
12117(a) (adopting the enforcement procedures set out in Title VII for purposes of ADA enforcement). 
 46. See sources cited supra note 45. 
 47. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). 
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settlement agreement between the charging party and the re-
spondent (an employer, union, or other entity covered by 
EEOC-enforced statutes). 
Successful Conciliation 
Charge with reasonable cause determination closed after suc-
cessful conciliation. Successful concilations result in substantial 
relief to the charging party and all others adversely affected by 
the discrimination. 
. . . . 
Withdrawal with Benefits 
Charge is withdrawn by charging party upon receipt of desired 
benefits. The withdrawal may take place after a settlement or 
after the respondent grants the appropriate benefit to the charg-
ing party.48 
In light of these definitions, it is difficult to determine the extent to 
which the “Withdrawal with Benefits” category overlaps with the “Settle-
ments” category, because some charges may be withdrawn pursuant to a 
settlement agreement and some may be withdrawn without a formal settle-
ment. 
According to the EEOC’s website, in fiscal year (FY) 2005, 11% of 
ADA charges (1,685) were resolved through settlements, 5.5% of charges 
(846) were resolved through withdrawals with benefits, and 2.2% (338) 
were resolved through successful conciliation.49 In FY 2006, the numbers 
were quite similar. The EEOC indicates that 12% of charges (1,812) were 
resolved through settlements, 5.8% of charges (866) were resolved through 
withdrawals with benefits, and 2.2% (330) were resolved through successful 
conciliation.50 
In terms of monetary benefits, the EEOC reports that it obtained $44.8 
million in monetary benefits for ADA charging parties in FY 2005 and 
$48.8 million in FY 2006.51 Based on the data described above, the average 
amount of relief obtained by each charging party was $15,615 in 2005 and 
$16,223 in FY 2006.  
  
 48. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Definitions of Terms, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/define.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).  
 49. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
(ADA) Charges: FY 1997–FY 2006, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-charges.html (last visited Nov. 5, 
2007).  
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
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By comparison, in FY 2005, the EEOC achieved 2,259 resolutions in 
the three relevant categories in ADEA cases and obtained $77.7 million in 
monetary relief, with an average award of $34,396, while in FY 2006, it 
achieved 2,361 resolutions in these categories for a total amount of $51.5 
million averaging $21,813 in recovery for each successful charging party.52 
Under Title VII, in FY 2005 the EEOC had 8,184 relevant resolutions and 
recovered $146 million with an average award of $17,839 per individual.53 
In FY 2006, there were 8,156 Title VII resolutions for which the EEOC 
obtained $126.5 million in monetary benefits, translating into an average of 
$15,510 per successful charging party.54 Under the Equal Pay Act (EPA),55 
the EEOC achieved 168 resolutions in FY 2005 for which it obtained mone-
tary relief and recovered $3.1 million, for an average award of $18,452, and 
in FY 2006 it likewise obtained $3.1 million in monetary benefits in 142 
resolutions, for an average of $21,831 per individual.56 The Title VII and 
FY 2005 EPA statistics, therefore, are quite close to those reflecting ADA 
recoveries.  
It should also be noted that charging parties may often accept relatively 
modest monetary relief in EEOC conciliations because their cases have not 
yet required them to invest the time, money, and emotion involved in pro-
tracted litigation. Moreover, ADA recovery amounts might be particularly 
low because many charging parties might be largely satisfied by the provi-
sion of reasonable accommodations that enable them to work comfortably. 
Non-monetary relief, such as reasonable accommodation, is not reported on 
the EEOC website.57 
B. Lawsuit Settlement Amounts 
As discussed above, settlement statistics are difficult to find and com-
pile,58 but research revealed two sources that were illuminating in this re-
gard. One is Jury Verdict Research® (JVR).59 In a 2001 publication called 
Disability Discrimination: Employment Practices Verdicts, Settlements and 
Statistics, JVR compared the median settlement amounts in different types 
  
 52. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) Charges: FY 1997–FY 2006, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/adea.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2007). 
Recoveries under the ADEA might be relatively high because, by definition, these cases involve older 
workers (forty years of age or older) who may have seniority and high salaries and, therefore, expect 
large backpay awards. See 29 U.S.C. § 631 (2000) (limiting the ADEA’s protection to “individuals [who 
are] at least 40 years of age”).  
 53. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Charges: FY 1997–FY 2006, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/vii.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).  
 54. Id. 
 55. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000). 
 56. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Equal Pay Act Charges (includes 
concurrent charges with Title VII, ADEA, and ADA): FY 1997–FY 2006,  
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/epa.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).  
 57. See sources cited supra notes 49, 52, 53, 56.  
 58. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
 59. See Jury Verdict Research Home Page, http://www.juryverdictresearch.com/ (last visited Nov. 
5, 2007).  
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of employment discrimination cases.60 Having analyzed settlements col-
lected during the “years 1994 through 2000,” it found the following median 
dollar sums:  
age cases—$65,500  
disability cases—$50,000  
race cases—$47,750  
sex cases—$70,000.61  
The disability category thus ranked third out of four in terms of median 
settlement amount.  
JVR describes its data-gathering methods as follows:  
Reports are furnished by court clerks, independent contractors, 
plaintiff and defense attorneys, law clerks, legal reporters, publica-
tions and media sources. Cases with at least a minimum of informa-
tion, including attorneys’ names, location of trial, court and docket 
numbers, date of trial or settlement and a brief explanation of the 
incident, are entered into the database and are forwarded to all 
known interested attorneys to provide missing or incomplete infor-
mation.62 
Some attorneys are apparently willing to cooperate with JVR, possibly 
because it does not generate a product that is widely distributed or easily 
available to the public. JVR publications are available at a cost to customers 
who order them.63 More specific searches of data sets are expensive and 
must be requested from a company representative.64 Consequently, potential 
plaintiffs could not obtain the information disclosed by the attorneys with-
out significant effort and expense, while litigating lawyers now have at least 
one resource that might enable them to make educated conjectures concern-
ing the value of their cases. By contrast, many academic journals and ABA 
surveys are easily accessible to all through web searches. 
Nevertheless, JVR provides the following caution to the readers of its 
Disability Discrimination publication: 
  
 60. See JENNIFER E. SHANNON & THOMAS D’AGOSTINO, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION: 
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES VERDICTS, SETTLEMENTS AND STATISTICS 13 (2001) (on file with Alabama 
Law Review). 
 61. Id. The publication notes that in state court the median disability discrimination settlement 
amount was $43,000. Id. at 14.  
 62. Id. at 1.  
 63. See Jury Verdict Research & Litigation Products, http://www.shoplrp.com/jvr.html (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2007).  
 64. See Letter from Beth Gross Jones, Services Specialist, Jury Verdict Research, to author (July 17, 
2004) (on file with author). 
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Jury Verdict Research® has increased its settlement data collection 
efforts at the continued request of its customers for analysis of this 
type of data. However, considering the immense and unquantifiable 
number of settlements reached annually, Jury Verdict Research® 
recognizes that, at this time, it is unable to gauge the size of the data 
sampling and cautions the reader concerning the interpretation and 
use of the settlement data.65  
In light of this qualification, I requested more detailed settlement statis-
tics from JVR. I received a list of cases that were settled during the years 
2002-2004 for which the company obtained settlement information. While 
the 2001 JVR publication does not indicate how many cases were included 
in its data set, the list I received is comprised of fifty sex discrimination 
cases filed in federal court under Title VII, thirty-four age discrimination 
cases filed in federal court under the ADEA, forty-one disability discrimina-
tion cases filed in federal court under the ADA, and seven pregnancy dis-
crimination cases filed in federal court under Title VII.66  
Based on these data, the following calculations were made: 
Case Type          Mean    Median 
Sex discriminations       $98,018   $81,000 
Pregnancy discrimination     $96,000   $57,000 
Age discrimination        $269,92567  $85,000 
Disability Discrimination     $415,225   $75,000 
According to this admittedly limited data set, ADA cases fall in the 
middle of the pack with respect to median settlement amounts and rank first 
with respect to mean figures. 
A second source is a study of nearly five hundred employment dis-
crimination cases filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois in Chicago that were settled by magistrate judges from 1999 to 
2005.68 Comparing disability discrimination cases to cases involving dis-
crimination based on age, religion or national origin, sex, sexual harass-
ment, and race, the study found that the median dollar amount recovered by 
  
 65. Shannon & D’Agostino, supra note 60, at 1.  
 66. Data provided by Beth Gross Jones to author (on file with Alabama Law Review).  
 67. In addition, there was an award of $250,000,000, which was not included for purposes of calcu-
lating the average because it would skew the results.  The case was a class action brought on behalf of 
1700 retired public safety officers.  See EEOC v. California Public Employees’ Retirement System (N.D. 
CA 95-03022).   
 68. See Minna J. Kotkin, Outing Outcomes: An Empirical Study of Confidential Employment Dis-
crimination Settlements, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 113 (2007).  
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ADA Title I plaintiffs, $35,000, was equal to or exceeded the amount re-
covered by plaintiffs in each of the other categories.69 The mean settlement 
amount for ADA litigants, $62,111.01, exceeded all but the mean amount 
recovered by age discrimination plaintiffs.70 A different comparison focused 
solely on lost wages and revealed that ADA plaintiffs’ median percentage of 
lost wages recovered, 61.03%, exceeded that recovered by age and race 
plaintiffs. ADA plaintiffs’ mean lost wages recovery, 105.82%, exceeded 
that of age and religion or national origin discrimination plaintiffs but not of 
those filing because of sexual harassment, sex discrimination, or race dis-
crimination.71 
IV. INSTITUTIONAL DISABILITY EMPLOYMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES 
In the field of Title I claim outcomes, one more territory remains largely 
uncultivated. It is reasonable to believe that many if not most individuals 
with physical or mental limitations who need work accommodations do not 
resort to the courts or even to administrative enforcement agencies. Instead, 
they approach their employers and request work adjustments, which are 
often granted without the intervention of any third party. Arguably, there-
fore, many requests are resolved informally through dialogues between em-
  
 69. See id. at 148 fig.12; infra note 70 (providing precise figures). 
 70. See Kotkin, supra note 68, at 148 fig.12. The study provides bar graphs with increments of 
$20,000 on the axis, but it does not indicate exact recovery amounts. See, e.g., id. I contacted Professor 
Kotkin and received further statistical details from her statistician, Rebecca Windom. She provided me 
with the raw data underlying the information reported in Figure 12. See id. Recovery figures are as 
follows: 
Case Type               Median   Mean 
disability (89 cases)          $35,000   $62,111.01  
age (83 cases)                 $30,000    $74,069.28 
religion or national origin (17 cases)     $32,500   $29,779.41  
sex (72 cases)            $31,250   $59,217.99  
sexual harassment (50 cases)        $31,250    $52,057.98 
race (144 cases)            $21,250    $40,399.42 
Email from Rebecca Windom, Urban Justice Center, to Sharona Hoffman, Associate Dean, Case West-
ern Reserve University School of Law (Dec. 5, 2006, 17:55:00 EST) (on file with Alabama Law Review) 
[hereinafter Windom, Email].  
 71. See id. at 154 fig.18. The study provides bar graphs with increments of 50% on the axis, but it 
does not indicate exact recovery percentages. See, e.g., id. I contacted Professor Kotkin and received 
further statistical details from her statistician, Rebecca Widom. She provided me with the raw data 
underlying the information reported in Figure 18. See Kotkin, supra note 70, at 154 fig. 18. Ms. Windom 
notes that “the differences in percent of lost wages recovered by type of discrimination were *not* 
statistically significant, in part because we were missing a lot of data on lost wages.” Windom, Email, 
supra note 70. Nevertheless, the following are the figures she provides:  
Case Type         Median   Mean 
disability (44 cases)      61.03%    105.82% 
age (42 cases)        51.84%    94.78% 
religion or national origin (9 cases)  62.50%    79.78% 
sex (23 cases)        77.55%   179.28%  
sexual harassment (26 cases)   107.45%    186.69% 
race (73 cases)       58.82%    164.29% 
No explanation is provided as to why fewer cases were included in this figure than in the figure dis-
cussed supra note 70 and accompanying text. However, it is likely that the researchers were not able to 
obtain lost wages information in some of the cases for which they obtained settlement amount data.  
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ployers and employees prior to the filing of EEOC charges or lawsuits and 
with no written settlement. This hypothesis is supported by information 
published in several studies that are detailed in this Part.  
A. Bruyère Study 
The most comprehensive study of informal employer accommodation 
requests was conducted by Susanne Bruyère of Cornell University’s School 
of Industrial and Labor Relations.72 In a study entitled Disability Employ-
ment Policies and Practices in Private and Federal Sector Organizations, 
Bruyère concludes that private and federal employers are in fact providing 
accommodations to applicants and workers with disabilities.73 The survey 
was conducted through a computer-assisted telephone interviewing system 
and involved members of the Society for Human Resource Management 
who were randomly selected from among small, medium, and large private-
sector organizations, as well as “human resource and Equal Employment 
Opportunity personnel [in] 96 . . . federal agencies.”74 The survey featured a 
large number of questions concerning policies and practices that affect ap-
plicants and employees with disabilities.75 It was answered by 813 private 
sector respondents out of 1,116 that were contacted (a 73% response rate) 
and by 403 federal agency representatives out of 415 that were contacted (a 
97% response rate).76 
Bruyère’s study relied on employer self-reporting and did not seek in-
dependent verification through interviews with employees or examination 
of accommodation records.77 This, of course, is a limitation, but is charac-
teristic of studies that rely on a survey technique.78 In addition, Bruyère’s 
results might be skewed by the fact that only 73% of private sector recipi-
ents responded to the survey. If the remainder of recipients did not respond 
because they have refused to provide requested accommodations, the out-
look for workers with disabilities might not be as bright as the study sug-
gests. 
Among respondents, only 13% of private employers and 14% of federal 
employers asserted that they “do not keep data on accommodations.”79 The 
  
 72. See SUSANNE M. BRUYÈRE, DISABILITY EMPLOYMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN PRIVATE 
AND FEDERAL SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS 1 (2000), available at  
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/edicollect/63 [hereinafter BRUYÈRE STUDY].  
 73. See id. at 8. Some of the study’s results were also published in Susanne M. Bruyère et al., Iden-
tity and Disability in the Workplace, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1173 (2003) [hereinafter, Bruyère, Iden-
tity and Disability]. 
 74. See BRUYÈRE STUDY, supra note 72, at 8. 
 75. See id. at 30–54. 
 76. See id. at 8.  
 77. See id. 
 78. See, e.g., Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 NW. 
U. L. REV. 655, 682 n.147 (2006). 
 79. See BRUYÈRE STUDY, supra note 72, at 12. Those who do not keep the data may do so in order 
to avoid discovery of accommodation information if they receive an EEOC discrimination charge or are 
sued. 
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remainder primarily maintain it for purposes of future accommodations, 
tracking costs, dispute resolution, reporting requirements, and claim han-
dling.80 
Respondents reported that they provided the following accommoda-
tions: 
Type of Accommodation    Private Employers  Federal Employers 
Making existing facilities accessible        82%      93%81 
Restructuring jobs/work hours           69%      87%  
Reassigning employees to vacant positions      46%      58%  
Modifying equipment              59%      90%  
Modifying training material            31%      49%  
Providing readers or interpreters          36%      79%  
Implementing flexible HR policies         79%      93%  
Changing supervisory methods          35%      55%  
Providing transportation accommodations      67%      86%  
Providing written job instructions          64%      69%  
Modifying the work environment          62%      93%82 
While these figures are generally high, they suggest that federal em-
ployers are even more apt to provide accommodations to people with dis-
abilities than are private employers. They may also suggest that federal em-
ployers more often hire individuals with disabilities and therefore face the 
need to provide accommodations with greater frequency. Unfortunately, 
some of the above categories are ambiguous and would benefit from further 
  
 80. See id. 
 81. It should be noted that the ADA requires that public services and public accommodations re-
move architectural and other barriers that inhibit accessibility for people with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 12131–12181 (2000). Public accommodations are private entities such as hotels, restaurants, and 
medical offices, whose operations affect commerce. See id. § 12181(7). The ADA requirement may 
explain the very high number of employers who state that they have made existing facilities accessible. 
Employers are likely enhancing accessibility not in response to employee requests for accommodations, 
but because they are required by law to do so. 
 82. See BRUYÈRE STUDY, supra note 72, at 11 fig.3. It is unclear from the survey how “modif[ying] 
work environment” differs from other types of accommodations, such as “restructure[ing] jobs” or 
“chang[ing] supervisory methods.” 
File: S.HoffmanMerged2 Created on:  2/11/2008 4:08 PM Last Printed: 2/13/2008 3:38 PM 
322 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 59:2:305  
elucidation. For example, the meanings of “flexible HR policy,”83 “changed 
supervisory methods,”84 and “modified work environment”85 are all unclear. 
Among private employers, over 93% asserted that their company had 
made at least one of the above-listed accommodations.86 When asked about 
specific changes to workplace policies, over half of respondents replied that 
they had done all of the following: taken steps to “ensur[e] equal pay and 
benefits, [introduced] flexibility in[to their] performance management sys-
tem[s], modif[ied] . . . return-to-work polic[ies], and adjust[ed] medical 
policies.”87 
Employers were also asked about the degree to which they provide pre-
employment accommodations for applicants in the following categories: 
providing accessible recruiting, interview, and orientation locations; provid-
ing accessible restrooms; modifying job applications, interview questions, 
and aptitude and medical testing; and providing information for people with 
impairments in hearing, vision, or learning ability.88 With respect to each 
question, between 10% and 60% of respondents answered that they never 
had to provide the accommodation at issue.89 Among those who did encoun-
ter a need to provide an identified accommodation, generally fewer than 
10% reported difficulty in providing the accommodation, except in the cate-
gories of providing information for individuals with hearing, vision, or 
learning impairments.90 
It should be noted that a separate study found e-recruiting websites to 
lack accessibility for people with visual impairments.91 Using “automated 
accessibility testing software,”92 the study analyzed “31 corporate e-
recruiting [w]ebsites.”93 It determined that all “of the job board pages [and 
t]he vast majority of corporate e-recruiting sites [tested] failed” to provide 
accessibility.94 A secondary “simulated application process evaluation 
[found] only three of . . . nine job boards and three of . . . twelve corporate 
[web]sites [to be] accessible enough to” allow people with visual impair-
  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id.  
 86. See SUSANNE M. BRUYÈRE ET AL., COMPARATIVE STUDY OF WORKPLACE POLICY AND 
PRACTICES CONTRIBUTING TO DISABILITY NONDISCRIMINATION 6 (2004), available at 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/edicollect/104.  
 87. See id. at 11. 
 88. See BRUYÈRE STUDY, supra note 72, at 13 fig.5. 
 89. See id.  
 90. See id. In these categories, 25% of private employers had difficulty providing information for 
hearing or learning impaired applicants, and 36% of private employers had difficulty providing informa-
tion for visually impaired candidates. Id. The figures for the federal sector were 8% and 15%, respec-
tively. Id. In addition, 14% of private sector respondents reported having difficulty providing accessible 
restrooms, though only 10% of federal employers experienced difficulty in this realm. Id. 
 91. See SUSANNE M. BRUYÈRE ET AL., HR PROCESSES AND IT ACCESSIBILITY FOR PERSONS WITH 
DISABILITIES: IMPROVING EMPLOYER PRACTICES UNDER TITLE I OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 
ACT 2 (2003), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/edicollect/67.  
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
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ments to complete all phases of the online application process.95 The study 
concluded that much improvement is needed in the emerging area of elec-
tronic recruiting.96 
The Disability Employment Policies and Practices study also inquired 
about the degree of ADA training received by human resources profession-
als in the private and federal sectors.97 Largely, the response was impres-
sive. Most often, training was provided with respect to non-discriminatory 
recruiting (reported by 91% of federal respondents and 85% of private sec-
tor respondents), reasonable accommodations (87% of federal respondents 
and 71% in the private sector), confidentiality requirements (85% and 87% 
respectively), and non-discriminatory disciplinary practices (87% and 85% 
respectively).98 Less frequently, training was provided concerning allowable 
limitations on health plans (given by 38% of federal employers and 51% of 
those in the private sector), the ADA’s interaction with other legislation 
(50% and 51% respectively), and written resources on accommodations 
(58% and 45% respectively).99 These latter areas, however, might be per-
ceived as more specialized, so that relevant training would be undertaken 
only by employers that are large enough to have legal counsel departments, 
benefits specialists, or human resources managers.  
In addition to a wealth of other information, the Disability Employment 
Policies and Practices study furnishes data about the resources used by em-
ployers to resolve disability issues in the workplace.100 Employers reported 
turning to a wide variety of resources, including the organizations’ EEO 
office, internal and external legal counsel, safety/ergonomics staff, state 
vocational rehabilitation services, the EEOC, disability manage-
ment/benefits staff, dispute resolution centers/mediators, union representa-
tives, the Job Accommodation Network,101 local independent living centers, 
and regional ADA technical assistance centers.102 Federal employers re-
ported using their EEO offices most frequently (90% of federal employers) 
followed by internal legal counsel (85%), with the smallest percentage of 
federal employers using technical assistance centers (20%) and external 
legal counsel (13%).103 Private employers most frequently turned to external 
legal counsel (82% of private employers) followed by professional societies 
  
 95. See id. 
 96. See id. at 2–3. 
 97. See BRUYÈRE STUDY, supra note 72, at 22 fig.19. 
 98. See id. 
 99. See id. 
 100. See id. at 23 fig.20, 24 fig.21.  
 101. Id. The Job Accommodation Network Home Page describes the organization as follows: “a free 
consulting service designed to increase the employability of people with disabilities by: 1) providing 
individualized worksite accommodations solutions, 2) providing technical assistance regarding the ADA 
and other disability related legislation, and 3) educating callers about self-employment options.” Job 
Accommodation Network Home Page, http://www.jan.wvu.edu/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).  
 102. See BRUYÈRE STUDY, supra note 72, at 23 fig.20, 24 fig.21. 
 103. See id. at 23 fig.20. 
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or business organizations (62%).104 These employers utilized unions (12%) 
and dispute resolution centers or mediators (10%) least often.105  
It should be noted that “court” was not one of the options offered to re-
spondents. Thus, it is unclear whether internal and external counsel were 
utilized in association with litigation or an EEOC charge, or prior to the 
filing of an EEOC charge when an employee has just filed an internal griev-
ance or submitted a request for an accommodation. However, Bruyère re-
ports that 72% of respondents indicated that they never had a Title I claim 
filed against them.106 Bruyère does not clarify what the term “claim” means, 
but it is reasonable to assume that to most employers, “claims” would in-
clude internal grievances, EEOC charges, and lawsuits. Thus, it is likely that 
a large majority of requests for accommodation are resolved without devel-
oping into formal disputes at all and that employers often consult their at-
torneys simply to determine the appropriate course of action in response to 
accommodation requests. 
B. Other Reports 
1. Minnesota State Agencies 
A second, narrower report focuses on ADA compliance by Minnesota 
state agencies in fiscal year 2005.107 This report, like the Disability Em-
ployment Policies and Practices study, indicates that employers are respon-
sive to the needs of individuals with disabilities.108 Of eighty-eight agencies, 
thirty-eight reported receiving a total of 279 new requests for accommoda-
tion, while fifty asserted that they had received no such request during the 
period July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2005.109 Of the 368 requests processed dur-
ing this time period, the agencies approved 305 (82.88%), denied 28 
(7.61%), modified 15 (4.08%), and had 20 (5.43%) still pending when the 
report was submitted.110  
The accommodations provided included qualified readers or interpreters 
(130 or 38.46%), new equipment or devices (64 or 18.93%), modified 
equipment or devices (40 or 11.83%), part-time or adjusted work schedules 
(34 or 10.06%), removal of accessibility barriers (27 or 7.99%), job restruc-
turing (22 or 6.51%), and alteration of rules, policies, and practices (13 or 
  
 104. See id. at 24 fig.21. 
 105. See id.  
 106. See Bruyère, Identity and Disability, supra note 73, at 1183. Employers that did report having a 
claim filed against them were generally large organizations. See id.  
 107. 2005 ADA ANNUAL REPORT (Oct. 2005), available at http://www.doer.state.mn.us/odeo-ada/ad-
tools/2005%20ADA%20Annual%20Report.pdf [hereinafter ADA ANNUAL REPORT]. 
 108. See id. at 4. 
 109. Id. at 2. The agencies receiving requests handled an average of seven requests each. See id. 
 110. Id. at 4. The agencies reported processing 312 requests made by current employees and 46 
requests made by applicants. Id. at 8. It should be noted, however, that there is a discrepancy between the 
total number of processed requests reported on this page (358) and the earlier-reported total (368) dis-
cussing the status of the accommodations. See id. at 4, 8.  
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3.85%).111 The average cost of the accommodations was $398.79, with a 
high of $23,192 and a low of zero.112  
Despite receiving hundreds of requests for accommodation, the agen-
cies reported having only nine complaints filed through their internal griev-
ance procedures and only a total of fourteen charges filed with the EEOC 
and Minnesota Department of Human Rights.113 Thus, the vast majority of 
requests for accommodation received positive responses from employers 
and did not generate any legal proceedings.  
2.  Maryland State Agencies 
An accounting of reasonable accommodation requests and resolutions is 
also included in Maryland’s 2005 Annual Statewide Equal Employment 
Opportunity Report.114 The report tracked the requests for accommodation 
received and processed by 25 state agencies during fiscal year 2005.115 The 
agencies received 35 requests from applicants and 225 requests from em-
ployees.116 Of these, 231 were granted, 22 were denied, and 6 were pending 
at the time the report was written.117 No details are provided concerning 
types of accommodation, costs, or further action taken by those whose re-
quests were rejected.118 
3. Workplace Accommodations Empirical Study 
Another source of information is a study involving interviews of em-
ployers who contacted the Job Accommodation Network (JAN) concerning 
workplace accommodations.119 The researchers interviewed employers in 
2004 and 2005120 and obtained responses from 540 employers who sought 
advice from JAN because they were asked for job accommodations.121 The 
  
 111. Id. at 5. Eight accommodations (2.37%) were categorized as “other.” Id. 
 112. Id. at 2. 
 113. Id. at 8. 
 114. MD. DEP’T OF BUDGET & MGMT., ANNUAL STATEWIDE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 




 115. Id. at 12. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. The report notes that all state agencies responded to the Department of Budget and Manage-
ment’s request for information and that these are the only twenty-five that indicated they had received 
requests for accommodations. Id. The report does not disclose how many agencies claimed they had 
received no requests for accommodation. Id. at 11–12. It should also be noted that the document indi-
cates that a total of 260 requests for accommodation were received by state agencies, but it only provides 
the status of 259 requests. Id. at 12. No explanation is given for this small discrepancy. 
 118. See id. at 11–12. 
 119. See Helen A. Schartz et al., Workplace Accommodations: Empirical Study of Current Employ-
ees, 75 MISS. L.J. 917 (2006). The article explains that “JAN is a free consulting service, funded by the 
U.S. Department of Labor’s Office of Disability Employment Policy.” Id. at 927. 
 120. Id. at 928. 
 121. Id. at 928, 933. 
File: S.HoffmanMerged2 Created on:  2/11/2008 4:08 PM Last Printed: 2/13/2008 3:38 PM 
326 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 59:2:305  
investigators found that 55.2% of requests were granted or “pending imple-
mentation,”122 while of the remaining 44.8% of requests, 74.3% were de-
nied, 19.9% were pending, and 2.5% were withdrawn by employees.123 Ac-
cording to the study, employers granted 61.2% of 402 requests made by 
employees whom the employer considered to have substantial limitations of 
major life activities and 42.6% of 101 requests made by employees with 
more minor limitations.124 
The study also addressed the cost of accommodations.125 It found that 
49.1% of accommodations were made at no direct cost to the employer.126 
Of accommodations with a direct cost, 74.8% involved expenditures of 
$500 or less in the first calendar year, with a median cost of $500.127 When 
attention was focused on the limitation’s degree of severity, the researchers 
found that for accommodations that required an expenditure, the median 
was $629 for employees “with substantial limitations” and $100 for em-
ployees with more minor impairments.128 While “the majority (79.7%) of 
employees [discussed during the interviews] had substantial limitations,”129 
employers were willing to accommodate even those who were not techni-
cally covered by the ADA if the cost was sufficiently low.130 
V. ASSESSING THE EFFICACY OF TITLE I OF THE ADA  
A. The Bad News: Judicial Outcomes and Employment Rates 
1. Low Plaintiff Win Rates 
I now turn to the question of what can be learned from the statistics pre-
sented above. It is indisputable that plaintiffs whose cases are resolved 
through federal or state court opinions very rarely prevail against employ-
ers.131 A number of scholars have proposed theories to explain this phe-
nomenon.  
First, judges might be resistant to the ADA because it fails to fit into the 
familiar civil rights model of other employment discrimination statutes.132 
  
 122. Id. at 933. 
 123. Id. The article provides no explanation with respect to the remaining 3.3% of requests that were 
not granted. See id. Of the requests denied, 58.5% were rejected because the employer determined that 
the employee was not entitled to an accommodation under the ADA or a state law, 0.4% were rejected 
because they were not feasible, and 15.4% were rejected for reasons that are not explained by the au-
thors. See id. 
 124. Id. at 935. 
 125. Id. at 937–40. 
 126. Id. at 937. 
 127. Id. 937–38. 
 128. Id at 938. 
 129. Id. at 930. 
 130. Id. at 939. 
 131. See supra Part II. 
 132. See Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 23 (2000) (“[I]n some ways the civil rights model is not an ideal fit with the prob-
lems posed by the issue of disability.”); James Leonard, The Equality Trap: How Reliance on Tradi-
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Statutes other than the ADA require only that employers refrain from ex-
cluding qualified individuals because of their minority status.133 The laws’ 
theory is that attributes such as sex, religion, color, national origin, or age, 
do not affect job performance,134 and, therefore, if minorities are included in 
the workforce, they will perform as well as other employees.135 By contrast, 
the ADA acknowledges that individuals’ physical and mental disabilities 
might pose limitations relevant to job performance.136 The statute does not 
allow employers to automatically exclude such people but rather requires 
that they be accommodated, at the employers’ expense, if accommodations 
are feasible and will allow individuals with disabilities to perform essential 
job functions.137 Some hypothesize that judges are simply uncomfortable 
placing such demands on employers, and, therefore, rarely rule in the plain-
tiffs’ favor.138 Employers, after all, are not to blame for the plaintiffs’ dis-
abilities, and it might thus seem unreasonable to require them to absorb 
costs associated with these conditions. Moreover, the burden of accommo-
dation is presumably distributed unevenly among employers, because some 
employers will have many applicants and employees with disabilities, and 
others will have none. 
One manifestation of this discomfort might be the courts’ extremely 
narrow interpretation of the statutory term “disability,” which is defined as 
“a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the 
major life activities of [an] individual.”139 Courts often find that a plaintiff is 
not sufficiently limited to meet the “substantially limits” requirement or that 
the constraint in question affects a narrow area of functionality but not a 
“major life” activity.140 Thus, for example, courts have repeatedly ruled that 
individuals with mental retardation do not have a disability because they are 
  
tional Civil Rights Concepts Has Rendered Title I of the ADA Ineffective, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 5 
(2005) (explaining that with respect to the ADA, “Congress wished to move beyond the traditional civil 
rights laws’ focus on evenhanded treatment; instead, the ADA imposed obligations on covered entities—
such as employers—to alter their environments in favor of those with disabilities”). 
 133. See Leonard, supra note 132, at 8. 
 134. Exceptions are allowed for the rare case in which a particular attribute constitutes a bona fide 
occupational qualification (BFOQ), such as when a woman is needed to serve as a dressing room atten-
dant in a women’s clothing store. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2000) (establishing the BFOQ de-
fense). 
 135. See Leonard, supra note 132, at 28–29. 
 136. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112.  
 137. See id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (establishing the reasonable accommodation mandate); see also Wa-
terstone, supra note 3, at 1818).  
 138. See Diller, supra note 132, at 22–23 (noting that there may be a judicial backlash against the 
ADA because courts are resistant to its reliance on the civil rights model); Waterstone, supra note 3, at 
1819 (stating that commentators have “suggest[ed] that courts (and the public), while accustomed to an 
antidiscrimination framework, are less comfortable with, and perhaps hostile to, an accommodation 
mandate”). 
 139. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). 
 140. See Michael H. Fox & Robert A. Mead, The Relationship of Disability to Employment Protec-
tion Under Title I of the ADA in the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
485, 489 (2003–2004) (“[O]nly a surprisingly narrow band of individuals with disabilities are protected 
by Title I.”); Sharona Hoffman, Corrective Justice and Title I of the ADA, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1213, 
1224–26 (2003) (discussing the courts’ restrictive interpretation of the term “disability”). 
File: S.HoffmanMerged2 Created on:  2/11/2008 4:08 PM Last Printed: 2/13/2008 3:38 PM 
328 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 59:2:305  
not substantially limited with respect to any major life activity.141 Conse-
quently, plaintiffs encounter significant difficulty convincing the courts that 
they are entitled to ADA coverage by virtue of having a “disability.”142A 
plaintiff who does not meet the threshold requirement of being an individual 
with a disability under the ADA will be given no further consideration by 
the court, and the questions of whether she should be granted a reasonable 
accommodation or is entitled to damages will never be reached.143 
The problem is exacerbated by another of the ADA’s requirements, 
namely, the obvious need for the individual to be qualified for the job in 
question with or without an accommodation.144 The statute does not demand 
that employers hire people who cannot perform the job under any circum-
stances, such as, for example, blind people applying for the position of truck 
driver.145 This reality creates a Catch-22.146 Plaintiffs who emphasize the 
seriousness of their limitations in order to be deemed to have a “disability” 
will often inadvertently convince the court that they are not qualified for the 
job; plaintiffs who emphasize that they are qualified for the job might be 
perceived as insufficiently limited in their major life activities, and, there-
fore, not disabled.147 Thus, there is a very narrow window of opportunity for 
plaintiffs to be both disabled and qualified, thereby meeting all requirements 
for ADA coverage. 
Yet another possible explanation for the low plaintiff win rate in ADA 
cases is that only the weakest cases remain unresolved until a court opinion 
is rendered. As previously discussed, many employers appear willing to 
provide accommodations before any formal dispute develops.148 Because 
many individuals with disabilities are likely satisfied by accommodation of 
their needs and are not seeking large damages awards, employers might be 
particularly receptive to internal resolution of many ADA claims in their 
infancy. Likewise, employers may feel better about providing a reasonable 
accommodation than paying damages because the former is a response to a 
request for help while the latter is compensation for employer wrongdoing. 
  
 141. See generally Jane Byeff Korn, Cancer and the ADA: Rethinking Disability, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 
399 (2001). 
 142. See Littleton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 231 Fed. Appx. 874, 876-78 (11th Cir. 2007); Martin v. 
Discount Smoke Shop, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 2d 981, 992-94 (C.D. Ill. 2006).  See also Michael Selmi, Why 
Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 556 (2001) (asserting that 
courts were concerned about the vagueness and potentially expansive scope of the ADA and conse-
quently, clipped the breadth of the statute excessively); Waterstone, supra note 3, at 1814–17 (discussing 
the failure of many cancer patients to prove that they have disabilities). 
 143. See, e.g., Martin, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 994 (“Because Plaintiff has failed to establish the first 
element of her prima facie case that she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA, she is not entitled 
to recover under the ADA.”). 
 144. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining the term “‘qualified individual with a disability’”); id. § 
12112(a) (prohibiting discrimination against qualified people with disabilities). 
 145. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (“The term ‘qualified individual with a disability’ means an individual 
with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of 
the employment position that such individual holds or desires.”) (emphasis added). 
 146. See Hoffman, supra note 140, at 1232. 
 147. See id. (discussing the Catch-22). 
 148. See supra Part IV. 
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Concern about potential workplace morale problems and adverse media 
attention might further induce employers to resolve claims early. Employers 
who seem unresponsive to the needs of people with disabilities might be 
perceived by other employees to be harsh and heartless and might be 
deemed by the media to be worthy subjects of exposés. In addition, some 
workers with disabilities might have modest expectations and be satisfied if 
their employers make sincere efforts to accommodate them, even if their 
requests are not fully granted. Thus, employers might respond positively to 
most reasonable claims asserted by individuals with disabilities and perse-
vere in litigation to the point of summary judgment only in weak cases as-
serted by obdurate and irrational plaintiffs.  
Commentators further argue that many individuals with disabilities are 
impoverished and cannot afford to retain lawyers and experts for ADA 
cases, which are expensive to litigate.149 Consequently, many strong cases 
may not be pursued for lack of funding. When plaintiffs do hire attorneys, 
they may receive incompetent representation, because the more experienced 
and skilled employment attorneys are familiar with the low plaintiff win 
rates and may be reluctant to accept ADA cases.150 Ineffectual representa-
tion will further weaken some cases as they are presented to the courts.  
2. Employment Rates of Individuals with Disabilities 
Another arena in which Title I of the ADA has failed to produce an im-
provement for individuals with disabilities is entry into the workforce and 
employment rates. According to a 1999 Census Bureau Current Population 
Survey, 34% “of men and 33% of women with work disabilities were em-
ployed [that year], compared to 95% of men and 82% of women without 
work disabilities.”151 According to a 2000 Harris Survey, only 32% of 
adults with disabilities between the ages of eighteen and sixty-four stated 
that they were employed, while 81% of people without disabilities in the 
same age group had employment.152  
Experts who have studied employment statistics have also concluded 
that employment rates for those with disabilities declined in the 1990s after 
enactment of the ADA.153 According to one source, from 1989 to 2000 the 
  
 149. See Louis S. Rulli & Jason A. Leckerman, Unfinished Business: The Fading Promise of ADA 
Enforcement in the Federal Courts Under Title I and its Impact on the Poor, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 
595, 595–96, 612 (2005) (discussing the poverty rate among individuals with disabilities, the expense of 
litigating ADA cases, and the fact that legal assistance is often unaffordable). 
 150. See id. at 616 (“[L]awyers are being driven away from litigating under Title I.”); Van Detta & 
Gallipeau, supra note 37, at 515, 574 (explaining that poor lawyering could be at the root of plaintiffs’ 
inability to prevail in Title I cases). 
 151. Bruyère, Identity and Disability, supra note 73, at 1173.  
 152. NATIONAL ORGANIZATION ON DISABILITY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: 2000 N.O.D./HARRIS 
SURVEY OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES (July 2000), available at  
http://www.nod.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewPage&pageID=1430&nodeID=1&FeatureID=861
&redirected=1&CFID=10343078&CFTOKEN=32075722.  
 153. See, e.g., DAVID C. STAPLETON ET AL., HAS THE EMPLOYMENT RATE OF PEOPLE WITH 
DISABILITIES DECLINED? 1 (December 2004), available at  
 
File: S.HoffmanMerged2 Created on:  2/11/2008 4:08 PM Last Printed: 2/13/2008 3:38 PM 
330 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 59:2:305  
employment rate for men with disabilities fell by 22%, while that of men 
without disabilities diminished by only 1%.154 During the same time, the 
employment rates of women with disabilities fell by 1%, while that of 
women without disabilities grew.155 Another study concluded that employ-
ment for disabled men decreased by 7.2% relative to employment for non-
disabled males from 1990 to 1995.156 Still other experts attempted to refine 
these statistics by providing more nuanced definitions of “disability.”157 
Thus, “[w]hen ‘disability’ [was] defined as an impairment that imposes 
limitations on any life activity,” the percentage of people with disabilities 
who were employed dropped from 49% in 1990 to 46.6% in 1996.158 When 
“disability” was defined as any diagnosed impairment, the decline was 
“from 84.7% in 1990 to 77.3% in 1996” for men, though women’s em-
ployment rates were static at around 63%.159 If “disability” was defined 
specifically “as an impairment that . . . limits the [function] of working, [the 
drop was] from 42.1% in 1990 to 33.1% in 2000 [for men and] from 34.9% 
to 32.6%” for women during that decade.160  
The reasons for this decline have puzzled many scholars, and several 
potential explanations for it have been developed. First, it is possible that 
the vagueness of the term “disability” makes it difficult to elicit accurate 
responses through a survey instrument.161 Some people with mild physical 
or mental limitations might consider themselves disabled, while others with 
more serious conditions might not, thus skewing survey outcomes.162 Fur-
thermore, when surveys attempt to define the term “disability” for respon-
dents, they do not use language that mirrors the ADA’s definition of disabil-
ity,163 namely “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits [a] 
major life activit[y].”164 Arguably, if one were to examine solely the em-
ployment rates of people covered by the ADA, one would find different 
statistics.165 
A second explanation could be that the ADA’s reasonable accommoda-
tion requirement has made employers even more reluctant to hire individu-
als with disabilities than they were before the statute’s enactment.166 Em-
  
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/edicollect/92. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 
J. HUM. RESOURCES 693, 705 (2000). 
 157. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 19–20 (2004). 
 158. Id. at 19. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See id. at 19–20. 
 161. See STAPLETON ET. AL, supra note 153, at 1–2. 
 162. See id. at 2 (explaining that an individual who works even though she has a significant impair-
ment might state that she does not have a disability, while an unemployed person with the identical 
condition might respond in the affirmative to a question about disability status). 
 163. See Bagenstos, supra note 157, at 21. 
 164. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000).  
 165. See Bagenstos, supra note 157, at 21. 
 166. See Leonard, supra note 132, at 56–61. 
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ployers, fearing that they will have to absorb high costs of accommodations 
if they employ individuals with disabilities, might prefer to reject their ap-
plications, thereby avoiding the accommodation question.167 Employers 
might calculate that the risk of litigation over an adverse hiring decision is 
minimal because discrimination is very difficult to prove with respect to 
subjective hiring decisions. The employer can often argue convincingly that 
the candidate was not sufficiently impressive during her interview or that it 
seemed as though the applicant’s personality was not a good fit for the job, 
and the unsuccessful candidate will not have a performance record at the 
company to prove her competence.168 
It is also possible that lingering stereotypes and biases contribute to the 
exclusion of individuals with disabilities from the workplace. Susanne 
Bruyère’s survey lends some credence to this theory.169 When asked about 
specific barriers to the employment of persons with disabilities, the indi-
cated percentage of employers responded that they perceived the following 
factors to be obstacles: 
Cost of accommodation: 16% of private employers, 19% of federal 
employers; 
Cost of training: 9% of private employers, 11% of federal employ-
ers; 
Cost of supervision: 12% of private employers, 10% of federal em-
ployers; 
Attitudes & stereotypes: 22% of private employers, 43% of federal 
employers; 
Supervisor knowledge of accommodation: 31% of private employ-
ers, 34% of federal employers; 
Lack of required skills and training: 39% of private employers, 45% 
of federal employers; 
Lack of relevant experience: 49% of private employers, 53% of 
federal employers.170 
These data suggest that employers often bar employment to people with 
disabilities because they believe them to be unqualified or too inexperienced 
for the job, and these beliefs might be erroneous in more than a few cases. 
  
 167. See id. at 56. 
 168. See id. at 59. 
 169. See BRUYÈRE STUDY, supra note 72, at 15. 
 170. Id.; see also Bruyère, Identity and Disability, supra note 73, at 1181. 
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Thus, low employment rates for people with disabilities may be partly at-
tributable to employers’ tendency to deny serious consideration to some 
applicants with disabilities because of perceived educational, training, or 
prior work history deficiencies, or, more bluntly, because of biased attitudes 
towards people with disabilities.171 Bruyère’s findings, however, are am-
biguous because she represents in another study that 51% of U.S. employers 
reported actively recruiting candidates with disabilities.172  
The most compelling explanation, however, might relate to the lack of 
universal health care coverage in this country. Ironically, employment can 
adversely affect the ability of individuals with disabilities to obtain adequate 
health care coverage because it renders them ineligible to receive Social 
Security Disability Benefits.173 According to a 2007 survey of 1,997 private 
and public employers with three or more workers only 60% of employers 
offer health insurance benefits to their employees.174 Employees with dis-
abilities, who may often work part time or have low-paying jobs, are less 
likely to receive employer-provided health insurance.175 The availability of 
public insurance for the disabled unemployed drastically reduces their in-
centive to seek employment and might make it impractical or imprudent for 
these individuals to work in the private sector.176 The increased availability 
of Social Security Disability Benefits (SSDI) and other benefits during the 
last two decades may have further contributed to the low employment rates 
in the disability community.177  
None of the reports discussed in this section includes statistics that re-
veal whether the number of individuals with disabilities seeking entry into 
the workforce has increased or decreased since the ADA’s enactment. Un-
fortunately, my research disclosed no empirical studies that address the 
question of how many people with disabilities have attempted to obtain em-
ployment and how many have found it impossible to do so. This absence 
constitutes one of several gaps in the empirical literature concerning the 
ADA. 
  
 171. See Bruyère, Identity and Disability, supra note 73, at 1195–96.  
 172. See SUSANNE M. BRUYÈRE ET AL., COMPARATIVE STUDY OF WORKPLACE POLICY AND 
PRACTICES CONTRIBUTING TO DISABILITY NONDISCRIMINATION 8 (2004), available at  
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/edicollect/104. 
 173. See Bagenstos, supra note 157, at 26–27 (discussing the importance of health insurance to 
individuals with disabilities). 
 174. The Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Educational Trust, Employer Health 
Benefits 2007 Annual Survey 3 (2007), available at  
http://www.kff.org/insurance/7672/upload/76723.pdf.  
 175. See Paul Fronstin, Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the Uninsured: Analtysis 
of the March 2005 Current Population Survey, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF, Nov. 2005, at 4.  
 176. See Bagenstos, supra note 157, at 27 (“[P]ublic insurance is saddled with requirements that lock 
people with disabilities out of the workforce.”). 
 177. See id. at 21–22 (discussing the relaxation of SSDI eligibility standards throughout the 1980s 
and asserting that this may have initiated the departure of many individuals from the workforce during 
the 1990–1991 recession); see also STAPLETON ET AL., supra note 153, at 4 (discussing the rapid growth 
in federal support programs, as a result of which, “[i]n 2002 [alone], the federal government spent $213 
billion [and the states spent $44 billion in assistance to] working-age [individuals] with disabilities and 
their dependents”). 
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Thus, the link between lower employment rates for people with disabili-
ties and the passage of the ADA is uncertain. Assuming that it is not attrib-
utable to flawed survey questions, the phenomenon might be largely a prod-
uct of economic and political realities in the United States, and conse-
quently, it is arguable that the ADA is not itself associated with diminished 
employment of individuals with disabilities. 
B. The Good News: Conciliations, Settlements, and Internal Resolutions 
1. The Statistics 
The picture painted by data other than judicial outcomes and employ-
ment rate statistics is much brighter for individuals with disabilities. For 
those individuals with disabilities who are members of the workforce, the 
post-ADA workplace appears to offer a more comfortable and hospitable 
environment. Ironically, the ADA might also offer significant benefits for 
individuals who would not technically be classified as people with disabili-
ties under the statute’s ever-narrowing definition but who are perceived by 
employers to be covered by the ADA because of illness or impairment.178 
EEOC merit resolution179 rates for ADA cases (22.1% in 2005 and 
23.4% in 2006)180 are well within the range of merit resolutions for charges 
brought under the other statutes enforced by the EEOC: Title VII (21.9% in 
2005 and 22.5% in 2006),181 the ADEA (19% in 2005 and 19.8% in 
2006),182 and the EPA (24.9% in 2005 and 23.1% in 2006).183 The average 
amount of monetary benefits obtained by the EEOC for successful charging 
parties ($15,615 in 2005 and $16,223 in 2006) is also comparable to sums 
obtained for individuals filing charges under other statutes.184  
Although a limited data set exists concerning lawsuit settlement 
amounts, the figures that are available are reassuring regarding disability 
accommodation in the workplace.185 According to JVR, median settlement 
amounts in ADA cases, $50,000 according to data compiled in 2001 and 
$75,000 according to data for the years 2002-2004, fall within the range of 
settlements for other types of employment discrimination cases.186 A study 
of nearly five-hundred employment discrimination cases resolved by Chi-
cago magistrate judges in 1999-2005 reveals that Title I settlements were 
  
 178. See Schartz et al., supra note 119, at 941 (“Employers provided accommodations to a substantial 
number of employees who did not meet the ADA’s definition of disability.”). 
 179. Merit resolutions are defined as “[c]harges with outcomes favorable to charging parties and/or 
charges with meritorious allegations [including] settlements, withdrawals with benefits, successful 
conciliations, and unsuccessful conciliations.” Definitions of Terms, supra note 48. 
 180. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) Charges: FY 1997–FY 2006, supra note 49.  
 181. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Charges: FY 1997–FY 2006, supra note 53.  
 182. Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) Charges: FY 1997–FY 2006, supra note 52.  
 183. Equal Pay Act Charges (includes concurrent charges with Title VII, ADEA, and ADA): FY 
1997–FY 2006, supra note 56. 
 184. See supra Subpart III.A. 
 185. See supra Subpart III.B. 
 186. See supra text accompanying note 61. 
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higher than those in most cases based on other protected classifications.187 
The study found that the median dollar amount recovered by ADA Title I 
plaintiffs was equal to or exceeded the amount recovered by plaintiffs filing 
cases alleging sexual harassment or discrimination because of age, religion 
or national origin, sex, and race.188 The mean settlement amount for ADA 
litigants exceeded all but the mean recovery of age discrimination plain-
tiffs.189 
Most significantly, reports concerning reasonable accommodations pro-
vided by employers outside of the litigation or administrative enforcement 
context reveal that many employers are generous in providing accommoda-
tions without any prompting by external parties. For example, in Susanne 
Bruyère’s study, over 80% of private sector respondents asserted that they 
made at least one of eleven listed accommodations.190 Likewise, 93% of 
federal employers represented that they had modified facilities to improve 
accessibility, implemented flexible HR policies, and altered the work envi-
ronment for ADA compliance purposes.191 Notably, 72% of respondents 
indicated that they never had a Title I claim filed against them,192 signifying 
that the vast majority of the accommodations were achieved without judicial 
or administrative intervention. 
Reports concerning ADA compliance by Minnesota and Maryland state 
agencies are similarly encouraging. The Minnesota agencies reported ap-
proving approximately 83% of requests for accommodations processed dur-
ing the 2005 fiscal year and granting modified versions of requested ac-
commodations in approximately 4% of cases.193 While the Minnesota state 
agencies received 279 requests for accommodation during the relevant time 
period,194 only fourteen complaints were filed against the agencies with the 
EEOC or the Minnesota Department of Human Rights.195 The Maryland 
agencies reported granting approximately 89% of accommodation re-
quests.196 Thus, almost all requests were resolved with a favorable outcome 
for the requesting party and without the intercession of external enforce-
ment agencies. 
A study involving 540 employers who contacted JAN was the least en-
couraging for Title I claimants, finding that only 55.2% of requests for ac-
commodations had been granted at the time of the interviews, while 74.3% 
  
 187. See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text. 
 188. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 189. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.  
 190. BRUYÈRE STUDY, supra note 72, at 11. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See Bruyère, Identity and Disability, supra note 73, at 1183. 
 193. ADA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 110, at 4. 
 194. Id. at 2. 
 195. Id. at 8. As noted earlier, Title I plaintiffs cannot file lawsuits without first exhausting their 
administrative remedies by filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC or a state administrative 
agency. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 196. MD. REPORT, supra note 114, at 12. 
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of the remaining requests were denied.197 This data, however, may not be 
representative of typical cases because it was garnered from consultations 
between employers and JAN, a professional consulting service.198 The re-
quests at issue might have been particularly problematic, inducing employ-
ers to seek JAN assistance. In the alternative, the employers contacting JAN 
might be particularly sophisticated about the ADA’s complexities199 and, 
therefore, they are not only inclined to seek advice, but are also less prone 
to easily granting accommodation requests.  
2. Explaining the Statistics 
Why are employers settling with claimants or responding positively to 
requests for accommodation in the workplace when they could very likely 
prevail in court if the cases were litigated to the point of a judicial opin-
ion?200 First, some employers might provide accommodations because they 
want to comply with the law and with their own sense of what constitutes 
ethical behavior.201 Second, litigation may be expensive and may generate 
negative media attention, and, therefore, its risks may well outweigh its 
benefits in the eyes of many employers. If the issue at hand is a request for 
accommodation rather than a hiring or termination decision, it may often be 
easier and far less expensive for employers to provide an accommodation 
than to become embroiled in litigation. Thus, employers might be disin-
clined to hire lawyers or to invest in the effort of conducting complex analy-
ses concerning the potential plaintiffs’ disability status under the ADA 
when they could simply provide the requested accommodation. 
The studies that have been conducted concerning costs of accommoda-
tions reveal that most accommodations involve very modest direct expendi-
tures or none at all. The Minnesota state agency report discussed above 
found that the “[a]verage net cost incurred per accommodation” was 
$398.79.202 The workplace accommodation study involving employers who 
contacted JAN found that nearly half of accommodations required no mone-
tary expenditure and for those that did, the median cost during the first year 
was $500.203 An analysis of approximately 500 accommodations provided 
by Sears, Roebuck and Co. from 1978 to 1992 showed that the average cost 
  
 197. See Schartz et al., supra note 119, at 928, 933.  
 198. See id. at 927–28, 933. 
 199. See supra Subpart V.A.1 (discussing the difficulties faced by plaintiffs who litigate ADA Title I 
cases). 
 200. See supra Part II (analyzing court determinations). 
 201. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3 (2006) (“If people view compliance with the 
law as appropriate because of their attitudes about how they should behave, they will voluntarily assume 
the obligation to follow legal rules.”). 
 202. ADA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 112, at 2. 
 203. Schartz et al., supra note 119, at 937–38. Many accommodations, such as provision of special 
equipment to facilitate job performance, may not require significant expenditures after the initial pur-
chase during the first year. 
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of accommodations was $121.42 during the 1978-1992 pre-ADA period,204 
and then, surprisingly, it dropped to $45 during the years 1993-1996.205 No-
tably, this study indicates that Sears regularly made accommodations even 
before it was required to do so by law, a practice that may have been preva-
lent in many other workplaces.206 A 1995 report to Congress by JAN as-
serted that, typically, accommodations cost approximately $200.207 It is im-
portant to acknowledge, however, that these studies do not address indirect 
costs relating to the hiring and retention of people with disabilities, such as 
potential absenteeism problems or increased health insurance costs.208 
Third, some employers, especially those that are small or new, may not 
be sufficiently educated about ADA jurisprudence to be aware of the courts’ 
narrow definition of “disability” and the strong likelihood that they would 
prevail in a lawsuit.209 Consequently, they might perceive Title I litigation 
as entailing greater risks for them than it actually does.  
Fourth, employers may not want to adversely affect morale in the work-
place by denying accommodations to ailing or disabled employees who may 
complain to their colleagues about the employers’ harsh treatment. If an 
employee who is suffering from cancer requests time off for treatment or 
added breaks because of unusual fatigue, many employers are likely to grant 
the accommodation without careful analysis as to whether a court would 
deem the individual to be a person with a disability under the ADA’s defini-
tion.210 Although thorough legal research would reveal that numerous courts 
have ruled against cancer patients on the disability question,211 litigation 
  
 204. See PETER DAVID BLANCK, COMMUNICATING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT– 
TRANSCENDING COMPLIANCE: 1996 FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO. 18 (1996). 
 205. See id. at 17–18. Overall, no cost was associated with 72% of accommodations, 17% generated 
a cost of less than $100, 10% required an expenditure of less than $500, and 1% cost $500–$1000. Id. at 
17.  
 206. See id. at 19. 
 207. See Michael Ashley Stein, Empirical Implications of Title I, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1671, 1674 
(2000). Professor Stein’s article refers to other studies of accommodation costs in addition to the JAN 
study. See id. at 1674–77. 
 208. Other indirect costs could include compromised productivity and morale problems associated 
with incorporating individuals with mental illnesses into the workforce. But see Schartz et al., supra note 
119, at 939 (discussing the benefits that employers enjoyed as a result of accommodating employees, 
including retaining qualified employees and avoiding the need to train new workers, improving employ-
ees’ productivity and attendance, reducing insurance and worker’s compensation costs, and enhancing 
diversity); Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability Accommodations, 53 DUKE L.J. 
79, 104–06 (2003) (suggesting that employment and accommodation of people with disabilities produces 
economic benefits for employers because such individuals have lower job turnover rates, lower absentee-
ism, higher productivity, and greater dedication than people without disabilities).  
 209. See supra Subpart V.A.1 (discussing the difficulties faced by plaintiffs who litigate ADA Title I 
cases). 
 210. Some employees with cancer will be entitled to unpaid leave under the Family Medical Leave 
Act (FMLA). See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a) (2000). However, this law applies only to employers with fifty or 
more employees, while the ADA applies to employers with fifteen or more employees. See id. § 
2611(2)(B)(ii); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). Thus, employers with between fifteen and fifty employees are 
not bound by the FMLA’s mandate but are required to comply with the ADA. 
 211. See Korn, supra note 141, at 399 (“Numerous . . . courts have held that cancer survivors are not 
disabled within the meaning of the Act.”); see also, e.g., Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 
192 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that the plaintiff failed to establish that her breast cancer constituted a dis-
ability because she was not substantially limited in her ability to work); supra note 141 and accompany-
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concerns may not be the only factor that an employer considers in deciding 
whether to grant or deny the employee’s request. For example, an employer 
who denies a cancer patient’s request risks alienating its workforce by 
seeming callous and unreasonable, and thus an employer may factor a gen-
eral morale element into its decision to grant or deny the employee’s re-
quest.  
The perception that many ADA claims are resolved internally and in-
formally through discussions between employers and employees is arguably 
supported by recent EEOC charge receipt statistics. The number of ADA 
charges filed with the EEOC peaked in 1995 at 19,798.212 The number of 
charge receipts steadily declined during the following ten years, reaching a 
low of 14,893 in 2005,213 though the figure jumped slightly in 2006 to 
15,625 charges filed.214 The overall decline might indicate that fewer indi-
viduals find it necessary to file a formal charge of discrimination in order to 
have their disability-related needs met in the workplace because of positive 
employer response to their requests for accommodation.215 
3. The Expressive Power of the Law 
The statistics discussed in this Article suggest that the vast majority of 
claims arising under Title I are resolved before cases are introduced to the 
realm of the courts. Consequently, despite the very low plaintiff win rates in 
judicial opinions, the ADA has effectively promoted civil rights by provid-
ing powerful incentives for employers to respond to the needs of workers 
with physical and mental impairments.  
The conclusion that the ADA changed employer behavior regardless of 
its anemic enforcement by the courts is consistent with a well-established 
theory concerning the impact of statutory mandates. In addition to govern-
ing human behavior through rules and sanctions, the law conveys social 
messages.216 Revisions in the law can induce people to change their beliefs 
and behavior, at least in part, because human beings desire social approval 
and strive to conform to public norms.217 The public statements made by the 
law can, therefore, be even more powerful than its threat of sanctions in 
  
ing text. 
 212. See The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990 (ADA) Charges: FY 1992–FY 1996, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-charges-a.html (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2007).  
 213. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) Charges: FY 1997–FY 2006, supra note 
49. In 2004, 15,376 ADA charges of discrimination were filed with the EEOC. See id. 
 214. See id.  
 215. Another possible explanation is that employees are learning of the purported judicial hostility 
towards the ADA and deciding not to pursue cases even at the administrative level. Other reasons for the 
decline might exist as well. 
 216. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2024–25 
(1996). 
 217. See Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 340, 
358–59, 369–72 (2000) (discussing incentives provided by the law that are associated with people’s 
desire for social approval). 
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influencing behavior.218 Some scholars refer to this phenomenon as the “ex-
pressive” function or power of the law.219 For example, environmental pro-
tection laws can mold human attitudes towards natural resources.220 Laws 
that prohibit littering can shape human conduct even if they are not accom-
panied by vigorous enforcement activity.221 Similarly, statutes governing 
cigarette smoking in public places, alcohol consumption by minors, and 
seatbelt use can shift societal norms and promote social advancement by 
virtue of their very existence.222  
The expressive power of the law might be evident in the ADA arena as 
well. Some evidence suggests that employers feel social pressure to express 
positive attitudes towards individuals with disabilities, though this has not 
translated into higher employment rates for the disabled in the last two dec-
ades.223 Employers may voluntarily comply with the ADA, at least insofar 
as providing accommodations to members of the workforce, despite litiga-
tion statistics that would seemingly discourage them from doing so. In fact, 
they might be even more generous than they are required to be under the 
courts’ narrow definition of “disability,” extending accommodations to peo-
ple with a variety of ailments who would not be covered by the ADA if their 
disability status were scrutinized by a judge.224 Thus, the existence of the 
ADA and public discourse about it might be eroding inherent biases against 
individuals with disabilities.225 
  
 218. See TYLER, supra note 201, at 3–4 (explaining that people may “feel personally committed to 
obeying the law, irrespective of whether they risk punishment for breaking the law [because of] personal 
morality or legitimacy.”); Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 609, 615 (1998) (“That people care intensely about what laws express is confirmed by the 
tremendous political salience of capital punishment, flag desecration, and other criminal-law issues that 
have only trivial or ambiguous regulatory significance.”); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory 
of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1650–51 (2000) (stating “that law influences behavior inde-
pendent of the sanctions it threatens to impose, that law works by what it says in addition to what it 
does”). 
 219. See Kahan, supra note 218, at 615 (speaking of “the expressive rationality of criminal law”); 
Erik Lillquist & Charles A. Sullivan, The Law and Genetics of Racial Profiling in Medicine, 39 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 391, 399 (2004) (explaining the view “that laws and legal actors can send stigmatizing 
messages that result in concrete harms separate and apart from any denial of government benefits”); 
McAdams, supra note 218, at 1650 (stating that law has both a punitive and “an ‘expressive’ function”). 
 220. See Sunstein, supra note 216, at 2024. 
 221. See id. at 2032–33. 
 222. See id. at 2052. 
 223. See Brigida Hernandez & Christopher Keys, Employer Attitudes Toward Workers with Disabili-
ties and their ADA Employment Rights: A Literature Review, J. REHAB., Oct./Nov./Dec. 2000, at 4, 4–5, 
available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0825/is_4_66/ai_68865430/pg_3. The authors write 
that “it has become socially appropriate for employers to espouse positive global attitudes toward these 
individuals[, but observes that] global acceptance of these workers seems superficial and is likely not 
indicative of significant efforts to employ them.” Id. at 5.  
 224. See, e.g., Schartz et al., supra note 119, at 939 (stating that employers appear willing to accom-
modate individuals without substantial limitations if the costs of doing so are sufficiently low). 
 225. See generally Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination Law’s Effects on Implicit Bias, in 3 NYU 
SELECTED ESSAYS ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW: BEHAVIORAL ANALYSES OF WORKPLACE 
DISCRIMINATION 69 (Mitu Gulati & Michael J. Yelnosky eds. 2007), available at  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=959228 (discussing the effect of antidiscrimination laws on people’s implicit 
biases).  
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Title I of the ADA, in particular, was designed to change workplace be-
havior and not to generate more business for the courts.226 The very concept 
of reasonable accommodation implies cooperation between employers and 
employees within the private realm of the employment relationship. The 
EEOC elucidates the reasonable accommodation mandate in the federal 
regulations it promulgated pursuant to the statute, stating that “it may be 
necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process 
with the qualified individual with a disability” in order to determine the 
appropriate accommodation.227 The emphasis, therefore, is on dialogue be-
tween employees and decision-makers in the work setting.  
The ADA’s introductory provision further reinforces the importance of 
the expressive power of the law.228 The text declares that the statute is being 
enacted in order to promote the goals of “equality of opportunity, full par-
ticipation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency” for individu-
als with disabilities.229 These ambitious goals can only be achieved through 
voluntary conduct by U.S. employers, who must embrace and become 
committed to them. If employment decisions are based purely on a calculus 
regarding whether one is likely to be prosecuted for a violation of the law, 
the status of individuals with disabilities will not be meaningfully advanced. 
While governmental enforcement is important for purposes of deterrence 
and interpretation of ambiguous statutory language by the judiciary, volun-
tary compliance should be the rule, and litigation should be the rare excep-
tion. 
4. A Call for Further Study 
This Article has questioned the common assumption that Title I of the 
ADA has done little if anything to promote equal employment opportunities 
for individuals with disabilities. It has uncovered statistical evidence regard-
ing EEOC charge resolutions, settlement statistics, and reasonable accom-
modation reports that suggest that employers are responding to the needs of 
individuals with disabilities who are members of the workforce. 
The data sets upon which I base my arguments, however, are clearly 
limited in scope and suggest, rather than conclusively prove, the points 
made above. I have also found two important shortcomings in the available 
empirical literature. First, no study addresses the question of how many 
individuals with disabilities are attempting unsuccessfully to enter the 
workplace. Thus, it is unclear whether the disability community’s low em-
ployment rate is a shortcoming of the ADA or is due to many individuals’ 
reluctance to apply for jobs because they cannot afford to lose Social Secu-
  
 226. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000).  
 227. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2007).  
 228. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101.  
 229. Id. § 12101(a)(8). 
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rity Disability Benefits and health care coverage.230 Second, it is unclear 
how many employers were providing accommodations even before the 
ADA’s enactment out of human compassion and a desire to behave rea-
sonably towards their employees.231 Without this information, it is impossi-
ble to assess the full extent to which the ADA has induced employers to 
engage in behavior that they would not otherwise demonstrate; that is, to 
offer accommodations that they would refuse to provide absent a legal man-
date. Unfortunately, this data deficiency is unlikely to be remedied because 
it would be very difficult to conduct a study that would elicit reliable infor-
mation about practices that were prevalent over fifteen years ago. 
For purposes of accurately measuring the impact of the ADA, much lar-
ger and more complete data sets must be compiled in the future. Although 
employers may hesitate to disclose information about internal grievance 
resolutions, settlement offers, and reasonable accommodations for fear that 
it will encourage frequent claims and demands for accommodation by em-
ployees, this information is crucial to a meaningful assessment of the stat-
ute’s efficacy. Indeed, more generally, information concerning the outcomes 
of unreported cases, settlements, and pre-litigation activity is essential to the 
assessment of any statutory mandate. 
Employers and individuals with disabilities alike have much to gain 
from the collection of ADA settlement and resolution information. The data 
is invaluable not only to academics and policy-makers who wish to assess 
the ADA’s impact, but also to private parties. Both employers and employ-
ees might look to precedents in determining whether to assert or grant a 
request for accommodation. For cases that have progressed beyond the in-
formal resolution stage, the data could enable parties to evaluate the worth 
of their cases while deciding whether to settle or proceed to trial.232 
At the heart of this Article, therefore, lies a call for further study of the 
ADA’s impact outside of the courtroom.233 Efforts such as those undertaken 
by JVR and the Cornell Employment and Disability Institute under the lead-
ership of Susanne Bruyère are invaluable and must be followed by further 
study initiatives. 
Experienced and skilled organizations such as JVR or the Cornell Em-
ployment and Disability Institute can induce cooperation from data subjects 
by guaranteeing that the employers’ and employees’ or applicants’ identities 
will remain anonymous when the information is published.234  
  
 230. See supra text accompanying notes 173–177 
 231. See BLANCK, supra note 204, at 17–19 (discussing accommodations provided by Sears, Roe-
buck and Co. during the pre-ADA years 1978–1992). 
 232. See Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 927, 927 
(2006) (arguing that the confidentiality of most settlements “skews empirical studies of discrimination 
litigation, which inform the public debate about the prevalence of bias [and] hampers lawyers’ ability to 
counsel and negotiate on behalf of discrimination claimants”). 
 233. See Burris et al., supra note 33, at 252 (“Having made the investment in the ADA, it is impera-
tive to gather the information necessary to determine what the actual costs and benefits of that invest-
ment are, and we ought to suspend final judgment until we have done so.”). 
 234. Researchers could de-identify survey responses and create a separate key so that, if necessary, 
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Yet, while the efforts of private enterprises are laudable, the collection 
of comprehensive information might best be achieved through mandatory 
reporting requirements involving the courts and the EEOC. Many parties 
ask courts to retain jurisdiction over settlements for enforcement pur-
poses.235 In these cases, the courts could exercise greater discretion concern-
ing settlement terms and limit the number of settlement agreements that 
remain confidential.236 In the alternative, data could be released in de-
identified form. Information about settlements could be collected by the 
Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics237 and compiled into 
publicly available reports.  
In addition, courts could be required to enter all public data about cases 
online in a manner that would make records easily searchable. Thus, infor-
mation could be garnered about cases that lack reported decisions without 
having to physically examine paper files stored in the courthouse.238  
The federal appellate, district, and bankruptcy courts already participate 
in the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) system.239 Each 
court has its own URL on the system and maintains its own database of case 
information, which can be accessed for a fee by those who register with 
PACER.240 A PACER database can be searched by case number, party 
name, social security number, tax identification number, or filing date 
range, depending on the court in question.241 Currently, however, cases can-
not be searched by category such as “employment discrimination” or ac-
cessed in more than one court at a time.  
A new service, Justia,242 constitutes an adjunct to PACER and allows 
for searches in various databases such as “All Federal District Courts”243 by 
a large number of categories, including “Americans with Disabilities—
Employment.”244 The retrieval appears in reverse chronological order and 
allows searchers to link to PACER for documents and additional docket 
  
responses could be linked by an authorized individual to the respondent. 
 235. See, e.g., Fiftal, supra note 41, at 504. 
 236. See id. at 505–06 (arguing that, for the most part, courts should employ a balancing test to 
determine whether settlement terms are to remain confidential in each case). 
 237. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DATA QUALITY GUIDELINES 9 
(Sept. 2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/dataquality/guidelines.htm#guide2 (“The collec-
tion of BJS statistics occurs when a determination is made by the U.S. Attorney General, the BJS Direc-
tor, or the U.S. Congress that there is a policy-relevant need for a data collection.”). 
 238. See Kotkin, supra note 68, at 127–28, 160–61 (describing the Chicago Magistrate judges 
mechanism for recording settlement information and discussing the benefits of collecting aggregate 
settlement data and making it publicly available); Yeazell, supra note 42, at 970–71 (discussing the 
potential creation of a mandatory settlement reporting system, subsidized by a small increase to the civil 
case filing fee, that is designed to publish de-identified data). 
 239. Public Access to Court Electronic Records Overview,  
http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/pacerdesc.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2000).  
 240. See id. 
 241. See PACER Database Frequently Asked Questions, http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/faq.html#CR2 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2007).  
 242. See Justia Home Page, http://www.justia.com (last visited Nov. 6, 2007).  
 243. See Justia Federal District Courts Filings & Dockets, http://dockets.justia.com/ (last visited Nov. 
6, 2007). 
 244. See id.  
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information, though the database includes only cases filed after January 1, 
2004.245 It would be most helpful if Justia were expanded to include earlier 
cases, and a similar electronic database were developed for state courts. 
EEOC regulations could also be revised to add a regulatory requirement 
that all reasonable accommodation requests and their resolutions be reported 
to the EEOC along with data concerning the number of employees with 
known disabilities in each workforce.246 Such a reporting requirement 
would not be unprecedented. The federal regulations require that employers 
with one hundred or more employees complete “Employer Information Re-
port EEO-1” forms and submit them to the EEOC on an annual basis.247 The 
form solicits data concerning employees’ “sex and race/ethnic[ity].”248 The 
EEOC guarantees confidentiality concerning employers’ individual identity, 
stating that it will only publish information that is aggregated by industry or 
geographic location.249 The EEOC could extend its record-keeping regula-
tions250 and require employers to report data regarding how many employ-
ees with disabilities they have, to their knowledge,251 and what requests for 
accommodation were made, granted, and rejected by the employer. The data 
could then be compiled into a report similar to the ones published by Min-
nesota and Maryland concerning ADA compliance by their state agen-
cies.252 If the information is truly to enable assessment of the ADA’s effi-
  
 245. See id. For ADA Title I cases available through Justia see http://dockets.justia.com/ (search 
using “Civil Rights – Americans with Disabilities – Employment” as “Lawsuit Type”) (last visited Nov. 
6, 2007).  
 246. It would be more difficult to ask employers to report the number of applicants with disabilities 
because employers are not permitted to make medical inquiries or conduct medical tests before extend-
ing conditional offers of employment to candidates. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2) (2000). Consequently, 
hiring officials who comply with the law will not be aware of any but the most obvious disabilities, and 
it would be unwise to institute a reporting requirement that might pressure them to violate the prohibition 
of premature health-related inquiries. 
 247. See 29 C.F.R. § 1602.7 (2007).  
 248. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, STANDARD FORM 100, REV. 3-97, 
EMPLOYER INFORMATION REPORT EEO-1 INSTRUCTION BOOKLET 3, available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeo1survey/e1instruct.html. 
 249. See id. at 2 (“All reports and information from individual reports will be kept confidential, as 
required by Section 709(e) of Title VII. Only data aggregating information by industry or area, in such a 
way as not to reveal any particular employer's statistics, will be made public.”). 
 250. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (empowering the EEOC to issue regulations for purposes of enforcing 
the ADA). 
 251. One complication would be the difficulty of assessing who is and is not an individual with a 
disability under the ADA’s amorphous definition. This might explain why employers have not been 
previously required to provide such information. To address this problem, employers might need de-
tailed instructions concerning who should and should not be considered to have a disability. The EEOC 
has developed a list of conditions that have been the subject of ADA charges of discrimination. See The 
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, ADA Charge Data by Impairments/Bases-Receipts, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-receipts.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2007). The agency could provide this 
list on its form and instruct employers to indicate whether they know of any employees with these condi-
tions. Employers, however, should not be encouraged to conduct medical testing or make inquiries 
solely for the purpose of filling out EEOC forms, but rather should be asked only to respond concerning 
disabilities that are otherwise known to them. The data gathering process should not make applicants and 
employees more vulnerable to discrimination and privacy breaches by inducing employers to seek in-
formation about disabilities that they would not otherwise discover. 
 252. See supra Subpart IV.B. 
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cacy, all employers covered by the ADA should be required to submit data, 
regardless of their size.253 
Among the respondents to the Disability Employment Policies and 
Practices study, 87% of private employers and 86% of public employers 
indicated that they already collect and record data concerning reasonable 
accommodations in their workplaces.254 Assuming that these responses are 
representative of U.S. employers generally, it appears that the overwhelm-
ing majority of employers already maintains information concerning the 
processing of reasonable accommodation requests and would not be signifi-
cantly burdened by a reporting requirement. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In recent years, scholars and advocates have expressed growing frustra-
tion with Title I of the ADA, decrying its failure to achieve a more hospita-
ble workplace for individuals with disabilities.255 Nevertheless, plaintiffs 
still file thousands of lawsuits under the ADA,256 the EEOC still receives 
approximately 15,000 ADA charges of discrimination each year,257 and 
employers still process numerous requests for accommodation.258 Why do 
individuals with disabilities persist in asserting their rights if they have little 
hope of success? 
This Article has argued that the Title I environment is less bleak than 
suggested by previously published studies. It is undeniable that plaintiffs 
rarely win in cases that are resolved through judicial opinion and that there 
has been no apparent increase in employment rates for those with disabili-
ties since the ADA’s enactment.259 However, ADA plaintiffs do not fare 
poorly with respect to EEOC merit resolutions,260 and evidence suggests 
that they also obtain meaningful relief through case settlements261 and re-
quests for workplace accommodation that are granted by employers.262 
These successes may explain the continued employee-initiated activity un-
der Title I of the ADA. 
In order to further develop and bolster this theory, additional informa-
tion is needed concerning extra-judicial ADA resolutions. I have argued 
generally that it is difficult to judge the efficacy of a law without compre-
hensive information about its effect outside the courtroom. This is particu-
  
 253. The ADA covers employers with fifteen or more employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). 
 254. See BRUYÈRE STUDY, supra note 72, at 12. 
 255. See supra Part II & Subpart IV.A (discussing low plaintiff win rates in Title I cases and several 
theories that could explain this phenomenon) 
 256. See Moss et al., supra note 4, at 305. 
 257. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) Charge Receipts FY 1992–FY 2006, supra 
note 49.  
 258. See supra Part IV (discussing institutional disability employment policies and practices). 
 259. See supra Subpart V.A. 
 260. See supra Subpart III.A. 
 261. See supra Subpart III.B. 
 262. See supra Part IV. 
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larly true in the personal and sensitive realm of disability discrimination, in 
which all parties often prefer to maintain secrecy about claims and dis-
putes.263 The Article calls for experts to conduct further studies and for 
mandatory reporting requirements to be established so that reliable informa-
tion can become increasingly available. Until such data are gathered, we 
will not be able to ascertain the degree to which Title I has fulfilled its 
stated purpose of “address[ing] the major areas of discrimination faced day-
to-day by people with disabilities.”264 
 
  
 263. See supra Part IV. 
 264. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (2000). 
